Before the Federal Trade Commission
Washington, DC 20580

In the Matter of COPPA Rule Review, Project No. P195404


COMMENTS OF
Center for Digital Democracy
Fairplay

American Academy of Pediatrics
Berkeley Media Studies Group
Children and Screens: Institute of Digital Media and Child Development
Consumer Federation of America
Center for Humane Technology
Eating Disorders Coalition for Research, Policy, & Action
Issue One
Parents Television and Media Council
U.S. PIRG

Katharina Kopp
Deputy Director and Director for Policy
Center for Digital Democracy
1015 15th Street, NW #600
Washington, DC 20005

Haley Hinkle & Brendan Bouffard
Counsel for Fairplay
89 South Street
Boston, MA 02111

March 11, 2024
Table of Contents

Introduction 5

I. The Commission should bolster COPPA’s data minimization principles by clarifying the Rule’s prohibitions on conditioning participation in an “activity” on the collection of personal information and retaining data for longer than “reasonably necessary.”

A. Data minimization principles beyond those in Section 312.7 limit the collection, use, and retention of a child’s personal information. 7
B. To effectuate the data minimization principles of Sections 312.7 and 312.10, the Commission should provide a definition of “reasonably necessary.” 11
C. The Commission should define the term “activity” broadly to include “any activity offered by a website or online service, whether that activity is a subset or component of the website or online service or is the entirety of the website or online service.” 13

II. The Commission should require a separate consent for disclosures to third parties and require operators to specify to parents that a child can use the website or service without parental consent for third-party sharing. 14

A. The Commission should require a separate verifiable parental consent for disclosures to third parties by operators and not condition access to consent. 14
B. Separate parental consent should be required for all third-party disclosures, even when integral to the nature of the website or service. 15
C. The Commission must recognize the ubiquity of data sharing arrangements such as data clean rooms and treat them as de facto disclosure practices under COPPA. 16
D. To curtail contemporary first-party operator data sharing practices, the Commission should clarify the definition of “release.” 23
E. To further protect children's privacy and minimize the sharing of personal information with third parties, the Commission should affirm that the sharing of personal information is limited to the specified purpose. 24

III. The third-party notice and consent requirement must also apply to persons or entities who collect personal information on a child-directed site or service, or on a mixed audience site when they do not act as operator with actual knowledge. 25

A. The Commission must address personal data collection through so-called “third-party trackers” and “plug-ins” and ensure that they are covered under the third-party disclosure consent when they are not operators. 26
B. Child-directed content providers that allow another person or online service to collect personal information through their sites are strictly liable for that collection and bear strict liability and can only release that information or make it available to third parties with parental consent. 27

IV. The Commission should place limits on the support for the internal operations exception, including limits related to engagement maximization, advertising attribution, and “contextual” advertising. 28
A. The Commission should exclude activities that maximize engagement, including platform-driven content personalization activities, from the internal operations exception.

B. Advertising attribution should not fall under the internal operations exception.

C. The Commission should remove contextual advertising from the internal operations exception and define contextual and behavioral advertising in the Rule.

V. The Commission should strengthen the notice requirements and ensure that COPPA’s data minimization and purpose specification requirements are effectuated via privacy notices and consent disclosures.

A. To ensure that operators follow COPPA’s data minimization and purpose specification requirements, the Commission should mandate that operators offer clear and specific notices describing their data practices.

B. The Commission should provide more specific requirements for third party disclosure consent notices.

VI. The Commission should clarify that an operator has “actual knowledge” of a child user sufficient to trigger obligations under Section 312.3 where it collects personal information from a child through inputs into a chatbot and the child’s input indicates that they are under the age of 13.

A. The combination of generative AI and chatbot technology raises the risk of harm to children’s privacy, particularly with regard to mass data collection and the potential for targeted advertising.

B. Given the substantial use of AI chatbots by children and the associated risks to their privacy and safety, the Commission must clarify that an operator has “actual knowledge” sufficient to trigger COPPA obligations under Section 312.3 when a user of a chatbot indicates that they are under the age of 13.

VII. If the FTC incorporates its school authorization policy into the COPPA Rule, the exception should include strict parameters on commercial purposes and require schools to provide information to parents.

VIII. The FTC is correct to add biometric data to the definition of “personal information,” but the Commission should clarify that biometric data includes not only the listed biometric identifiers, but any information derived therefrom.

A. There has been a rapid rise in the problematic collection and use of biometric data.

B. Biometric data is immutable, personally identifiable, cannot be reliably de-identified, and permits the contacting of a child.

C. Data derived from the collection or use of biometric identifiers should be included in the definition of personal information, including but not limited to demographic information like age, gender, race, and physical description, as well as behavioral data such as emotional state, movement patterns, and psychological profiles.

D. The Commission should not allow any additional exceptions to the use of biometric information without parental consent, even for VPC or other security features.
IX. We support the Commission’s proposal to define data security program requirements under the Rule and encourage the addition of privacy program requirements.

Conclusion

Appendix A: Data Minimization and Purpose Specification

1. TikTok
2. YouTube Kids
3. Microsoft: Minecraft

Appendix B: Problematic Privacy Policy Practices

1. Budge Studios
2. Roblox
3. YouTube Kids
4. Toca Life World
5. Outfit7
Introduction

Center for Digital Democracy (CDD), Fairplay, American Academy of Pediatrics, Berkeley Media Studies Group, Children and Screens: Institute of Digital Media and Child Development, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Humane Technology, Eating Disorders Coalition for Research, Policy, & Action, Issue One, Parents Television and Media Council, and U.S. PIRG (collectively, “Children’s Advocates”) appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s proposed update to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Rule. As many of our organizations advocate for new and increased online protections for both kids and teens, COPPA remains a critical tool for limiting the commercial surveillance of children by protecting their privacy and curbing marketers’ ability to target and influence them.

It has been over ten years since the Commission initiated its last COPPA Rule review and over four since the agency issued a notice of inquiry in the current Rule update process. During that time, strong regulations to protect kids’ privacy have become more important than ever. Children remain high-value targets for marketers, whose brand safety initiatives leave no doubt that Big Tech knows children under 13 are on their platforms. ¹ Marketers offer household targeting services that provide advertisers data about the presence and age of children in a viewer’s home, among many other categories of personal information. ² Further, data-gathering, ad-supported streaming video channels aimed at children, part of the growing number of so-called FAST services (free advertiser-supported TV), are exploding. ³ And kids’ pester power – that is, their ability to influence family purchasing based on the ads they see – continues to be touted by advertising firms. ⁴ Ultimately, as described in more detail in our comments below, ad tech companies are constantly developing new ways to profile and

---


⁴ Devra Prywes, New Infographic! The Path to Toy Sales Success, SuperAwesome (Jan. 12, 2024) (“Kids’ influence has increased 10% YOY, and 98% of parents consult their kids on toy purchases. 88% of parents buy toys based on their children’s expressed wishes.”), https://www.superawesome.com/blog/new-infographic-the-path-to-toy-sales-success/. 
target users, alleging all the while that these new capabilities are more “privacy sensitive.”

As advocates Center for Digital Democracy and Fairplay, et al. outlined in our 2019 comments on the Commission’s notice of inquiry, increased COPPA enforcement is critical to ensuring that operators comply with the Rule and policies established by the Commission. We appreciate the agency’s recent COPPA enforcement actions, including its recent action against Epic Games, but increased COPPA enforcement remains pressing. We urge the Commission that COPPA enforcement actions will improve compliance and thereby protections for children across the market, not just for the users of the operators impacted.

Ultimately, we appreciate the Commission’s commitment to ensuring that the COPPA Rule is appropriately updated to address emerging threats to children’s privacy, and we support many of the proposals outlined in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. In the comments below, Children’s Advocates outline their support for a number of proposals and advocate for clarifications and improvements targeted at issues including:

- The emerging risks posed to children by AI-powered chatbots and biometric data collection.
- The need to apply COPPA’s data minimization requirements to data collection, use, and retention to reduce the amount of children’s data in the audience economy and to limit targeted marketing.
- The applicability of the Rule’s provisions – including notice and the separate parental consent for collection and disclosure – to the vast networks of third parties that claim to share children’s data in privacy safe ways but still utilize young users’ personal information for marketing.
- The threats posed to children by ed tech platforms and the necessity of strict limitations on any use authorized by schools.
- The need for clear notice, security program, and privacy program requirements in order to effectively realize COPPA’s limitations on the collection, use, and sharing of personal information.

---

5 See Section IV, infra.
I. The Commission should bolster COPPA’s data minimization principles by clarifying the Rule’s prohibitions on conditioning participation in an “activity” on the collection of personal information and retaining data for longer than “reasonably necessary.”

A substantial number of harms to children’s privacy stem from the unreasonable and unnecessary collection, use, and retention of children’s personal information online. As detailed in Sections II and III, current data collection practices create unacceptable risks to the privacy and security of children’s personal information, exposing sensitive children’s information, including precise location information, immutable biometric characteristics, physical or mental health conditions, and financial information.

Children are uniquely vulnerable to modern data collection practices because the tools of commercial surveillance are designed to shape an individual’s preferences and beliefs. COPPA was enacted to address these concerns by limiting the use of personal information to target children with predatory marketing. The best way to accomplish that goal is through effective data minimization practices.

The Commission correctly emphasizes the importance of data minimization in its proposed Rule update, particularly in regard to COPPA’s requirement that operators not condition participation in an online activity on the unreasonable disclosure of personal

---


To more effectively realize this principle, we urge the Commission to provide additional clarification and guidance. First, the Commission should provide guidance that data minimization can only be implemented when platforms adhere to the principles of purpose specification and data use limitation. Along these lines, the Commission must clarify that combined, COPPA’s provisions limit the collection, use, and retention of a child’s personal information to that which is reasonably necessary to provide access to an online service or activity and that operators are therefore prohibited from using and retaining children’s personal information for unrelated secondary purposes. This would ensure that the privacy of children’s personal information is protected from collection through deletion. Second, the Commission should provide a definition of “reasonably necessary” to ensure that the collection, use, and retention of personal information is narrowly tailored, relevant, and proportionate to the specific use or uses for which it is disclosed. Lastly, the Commission should provide a broad definition of “activity” that includes “any activity offered by a website or online service.”

A. Data minimization principles beyond those in Section 312.7 limit the collection, use, and retention of a child’s personal information.

Section 312.7 of the Rule prohibits an operator from “conditioning a child’s participation in a game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on the child’s disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in such activity.” In the proposed Rule update, the Commission explained that “this provision serves as an outright prohibition on collecting more personal information than is reasonably necessary,” and therefore “operators may not collect more information than is reasonably necessary for such participation, even if the operator obtains consent for the collection of information that goes beyond what is reasonably necessary.” This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with previous Commission guidance, enforcement actions, and the general principles of data minimization that effectuate COPPA’s mandate. Because Section 312.7 only runs to the disclosure of more information than unreasonably necessary, Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to make explicit to operators that through other provisions of the rule, the data

---

14 16 C.F.R. § 132.7.
15 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2060.
minimization principle applies to collection, use, and retention of personal information, and specifically, that the principles of purpose specification and use limitation must also apply.

The Commission has repeatedly emphasized the need for operators to disclose the specific use or purpose for which a child’s personal information is collected, retained, and disclosed. For example, Section 312.4(d)(2) as currently written requires an operator to provide parents 17 with a clear and understandable notice describing the collection, use, and disclosure of children’s personal information, without material that is unrelated, confusing, or contradictory. Proposed language for Sections 312.4(d)(4) and (5) would prohibit an operator from collecting a persistent identifier or audio file under the internal operations exception without specifying the specific purpose for which they are being collected and detailing how the operator will otherwise comply with applicable use restrictions. Proposed language for 312.4(c)(1)(iv) would require that “operators sharing personal information with third parties identify the third parties as well as the purposes for such sharing[.]” Under the proposed changes to Section 312.8’s security requirements, operators would be directed to “maintain a written children’s data retention policy that sets forth the purposes for which children’s personal information is collected, [and] the business need for retaining such information.” And Section 312.5 requires an operator to provide notice of the specific purpose for disclosing personal information to third parties. This concept of use (or sharing, as in the case of the third-party disclosure) specification is directly linked to the principles of data minimization and the effective enforcement of COPPA, because without understanding how the collection and retention of personal information is linked to a specific purpose, neither parents nor the Commission can determine whether that specific purpose is reasonably necessary. 18

COPPA’s purpose specification requirements can also be found in Section 312.10 of the Rule, which says an operator may “retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected.” 19 The Commission proposes to further clarify that 312.10 prohibits the retention of personal information “for any secondary purpose.” 20 This additional language clarifies that personal data can only be retained for the purpose specified at the time of collection and not for any other purpose. As an example, the Commission states that an operator which collected an email address for the primary purpose of account creation, “could not then use that email address for marketing

---

17 As in the COPPA Rule itself, all references to “parents” herein indicate a child’s parent or legal guardian.
18 Note that purpose specification” requires not only to specify a purpose but to link a certain data element to a specific purpose. We address this in Section IV on notice.
19 16 C.F.R. § 132.10
20 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2062.
purposes” without obtaining parental consent for that secondary use.\footnote{Id.} The Commission noted in the proposed Rule update that Section 312.10 and Section 312.7 are meant to work in concert, stating “[t]hese proposed modifications [to Section 312.10] are intended to reinforce section 312.7’s data minimization requirements.”\footnote{Id.}

We applaud the Commission’s proposed changes to Sections 312.7 and 312.10, but we believe stronger clarification on the use of personal information is needed. Together, Sections 312.7 and 312.10 prevent an operator from collecting or retaining more personal information from a child than is reasonably necessary to provide access to an online activity. However, neither of these provisions explicitly prohibits an operator from using personal information - which was originally collected for a reasonably necessary purpose or purposes - for additional, unnecessary purposes, unrelated to the primary purpose for which it was collected. For example, if an operator were to collect a child’s specific geolocation under Section 312.7 because it is reasonably necessary to provide that child with a local weather forecast, it could retain that personal information as long as it is reasonably necessary to continue fulfilling that specific purpose under Section 312.10. Unfortunately, it might also be possible for that operator to use the child’s location information concurrently for a secondary, unnecessary purpose, such as delivering optimized content or creating a user profile for advertising. In effect, this situation requires the parent of that child to specifically identify this secondary purpose in the notice and consent provided by the operator (assuming it is actually listed in the notice), attempt to decline consent for that specific secondary purpose (which is essentially impossible), or choose not to allow their child to access the operator’s service altogether.

This situation is antithetical to the data minimization principles that underlie COPPA, and is contrary to the intended outcome of Sections 312.7, 312.10, and 312.4. The Commission has stated that an operator cannot collect or retain personal information that is not reasonably necessary to allow a child to participate in an online activity. It follows that operators should not be allowed to use personal information for more than the originally specified purpose or purposes. Otherwise, the Commission will create a perverse incentive in which operators may collect information under the guise that it is reasonably necessary, only to then use that information for commercial surveillance or other harmful secondary purposes. We urge the Commission to clarify that operators must adhere to the data minimization practices required by Sections 312.7 and 312.10 and can only collect, use, or retain a child’s personal information for the specific purpose for which it was collected.

\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id.}
B. To effectuate the data minimization principles of Sections 312.7 and 312.10, the Commission should provide a definition of “reasonably necessary.”

In practice, it is left to the discretion of an operator to determine whether the personal information it collects and retains from a child is “reasonably necessary” to facilitate that child’s participation in an online activity. While the Commission has provided some guidance through enforcement actions, it has not provided a specific standard for operators to follow. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that operators generally fail to provide effective privacy notices that detail the specific purposes for which personal information is being collected, as discussed in Section II, III, and V. As a result, it is impossible for parents, advocates, or the Commission to evaluate whether operators are collecting, using, and retaining personal information in accordance with Sections 312.7 and 312.10. As such, we urge the Commission to define “reasonably necessary” collection, use, and retention of personal information as that which is narrowly tailored, relevant, and proportional to the stated purpose or purposes listed in the notice and consent.

We believe this definition provides clear guidance to operators as to what information is reasonably necessary to collect from children, while also allowing parents to better evaluate the ways in which their child’s data will be used. To provide further explanation, information collection is “narrowly tailored” when it is strictly limited to the functioning of the website or online service. It is “relevant” when it has a rational connection to the stated purpose for which it was collected. And it is “proportionate” when the personal information’s utility or purpose to the function of an online activity is consistent with its level of sensitivity and potential harm to privacy. Thus, proportionality mandates that as information sensitivity increases, the importance of the purpose that information serves must increase as well. Indeed, we urge the Commission to clarify that the collection of particularly sensitive personal information –

---

24 Such essential functions include network communications, authentication, security, and legal compliance. See In re Facebook, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4365 (Apr. 28, 2020) (proposed decision and order), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/c4365facebookproposedmodifieddecisionandorder.pdf. These do not include uses that allow operators to develop, train, or otherwise benefit models or create detailed profiles about a child for marketing purposes.
26 For other uses of proportionality, see California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100. The proposed ADPPA also uses proportionality. See American Data Privacy Protection Act, H.R.8152, 117th Cong. § 101 (2022).
including but not limited to health,\textsuperscript{27} financial,\textsuperscript{28} biometric,\textsuperscript{29} geolocation,\textsuperscript{30} or browsing data\textsuperscript{31} – must not be collected unless the operator can show that such collection is strictly necessary\textsuperscript{32} to carry out an essential function of the operator’s site or service. For example, if an operator provided an app with the express purpose of helping children track physical fitness, that operator could establish that the collection of sensitive biometric data such as a child’s heart rate is strictly necessary to carry out the function of the app. However, if an operator provided a site or service that offered general online gaming, it could not collect a child’s heart rate data simply to provide an extraneous feature which is minimally necessary to the overall function of the operator’s service.

This proposed definition of “reasonably necessary” has been widely accepted in other prominent privacy regulations.\textsuperscript{33} California’s Consumer Privacy Act, for example, requires that data collection be necessary and proportionate to achieve the original purpose for which it was collected.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, Article 5(1)(c) of the GDPR establishes that personal data “shall be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.”\textsuperscript{35} Should the Commission adopt this proposed definition for the “reasonably necessary” collection, use, and retention of a child’s personal information, it 1) would provide greater clarification to operators, 2) create consistency between COPPA and other privacy regulations, 3) protect children’s personal information throughout its lifecycle, from collection to deletion, and 4) enable parents to better understand the costs and benefits of disclosing their child’s personal information.

\textsuperscript{27} See Federal Trade Commission, Weight Watchers, supra note 9.
\textsuperscript{28} Everalbum, Inc., C-4743 (F.T.C. 2021); Rite Aid Corp., C-4308 (F.T.C. 2010), amended by Rite Aid Corp., C-4308 (F.T.C. 2024).
\textsuperscript{29} See Everalbum, Inc., C-4743 (F.T.C. 2021)
\textsuperscript{30} See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Warns Gator Group, supra note 7.
\textsuperscript{32} The proposed ADPPA gives an example of a “strictly necessary” standard for sensitive information and gives examples of what purposes are “strictly necessary,” including completing a transaction or preventing a security incident. See American Data Privacy Protection Act, H.R.8152, 117th Cong. § 102(2), (3) (2022).
\textsuperscript{34} California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations, at § 7002.
\textsuperscript{35} General Data Protection Regulation at Art. 5(1)(c).
Lastly, the Commission has asked to what extent it should consider whether certain data practices are disclosed to a parent when assessing whether those data collection practices are “reasonably necessary” under the Rule.\textsuperscript{36} We urge the Commission to consider existing parental disclosures as irrelevant when proposing a final definition of “reasonably necessary.”\textsuperscript{37} Operators are bound by the data minimization principles of Section 312.7 and 312.10 regardless of parental consent. The Commission cannot expect parents to parse out the highly nuanced and technically complicated details that determine whether a specific type of personal information is required to carry out the function of an online activity. Information is either reasonably necessary or it is not. So long as the Commission follows the publication of its final Rule with sufficient enforcement actions, operators will be well incentivized to make those determinations properly.

C. The Commission should define the term “activity” broadly to include “any activity offered by a website or online service, whether that activity is a subset or component of the website or online service or is the entirety of the website or online service.”

The Commission proposes adding new language to address the meaning of “activity” as it is used in Section 312.7.\textsuperscript{38} Specifically, the Commission is considering adding language that defines “activity” as “any activity offered by a website or online service, whether that activity is a subset or component of the website or online service or is the entirety of the website or online service.”\textsuperscript{39} Children’s Advocates support the inclusion of this definition.

The use of the term “activity” has been consistent from the text of the COPPA statute through the subsequent Rulemakings.\textsuperscript{40} That is, the term has been used in its most broad sense, as a catch-all without any specific limiting definition. In the 1999 COPPA rule, the Commission provided limited clarification, stating that section 312.7 “prohibits operators from tying the provision of personal information to such popular and persuasive incentives as prices or games, while preserving children’s access to such ‘activities.’”\textsuperscript{41} At the time of its adoption nearly 25 years ago, the types of online activities available to children would have been extremely limited compared to what is available today. Use of the word “activity,” has been a proper catch-all for whatever activities are

\textsuperscript{36} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2071.
\textsuperscript{37} Id.
\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 2060.
\textsuperscript{39} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} 1999 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 59906.
available online during the current time period, be it games, prizes, sites, services, or apps. As such, providing a broad definition for “activity,” as proposed by the Commission, is consistent with the COPPA statute and protects the interest of children’s privacy as technology advances.

II. The Commission should require a separate consent for disclosures to third parties and require operators to specify to parents that a child can use the website or service without parental consent for third-party sharing.

Children’s Advocates support the Commission’s proposal to require operators to obtain separate verifiable parental consent before disclosing personal information collected from a child under Section 312.5(a)(2). Operators should not condition access to the website or online service on such consent. This clarification operationalizes an existing rule requirement. It will benefit families and uphold the intent of COPPA. However, the Commission should revise and clarify some aspects of third-party disclosures. Firstly, it should reconsider its proposal that separate consent is not required when disclosures are integral to the nature of the website or service. Parents should have the opportunity to consent to all types of disclosure, even if they are integral to the website or service, as these are some of the riskiest practices involving children’s personal information. Secondly, to effectively address the widespread data sharing practices in today’s audience economy and to limit ongoing targeted advertising to children without parental consent, the Commission should clarify the meaning of “release” to include contemporary first-party sharing practices. This is crucial in addressing sophisticated data-driven “collaboration” and sharing techniques utilized by first-party marketers or platforms to target and contact children with advertising, particularly through data “clean room” practices. Finally, to minimize the risk of sharing with third parties based on consent and to ensure meaningful parental consent, the Commission must affirm that sharing and subsequent use must be limited to the specified entity and purpose only.

A. The Commission should require a separate verifiable parental consent for disclosures to third parties by operators and not condition access to consent.

Children’s Advocates strongly support the FTC’s proposal that operators must obtain separate verifiable parental consent before disclosing personal information collected from a child. We do not consider this proposal a “modification” or a “bolstering” of the rule, but rather a clarification. Section 312.5(a)(2) currently states that “[a]n operator must give the parent the option to consent to the collection and use of the child’s information without consenting to disclosure of his or her personal
information to third parties.” The requirement for a separate verifiable consent for disclosures was put forward in 1999 as part of the initial rule.\textsuperscript{42} The proposed clarification simply operationalizes this requirement and is overdue.

Affording parents the choice to consent to the release of their children’s data into the increasingly predatory data ecosystem is in line with COPPA’s original intent and addresses an ongoing problem. COPPA was enacted in 1998 to curb unchecked data practices that target children and the harmful effects of predatory marketing.\textsuperscript{43} The importance of limiting disclosures to third parties or making children’s personal data accessible to entities other than the operator cannot be overstated, as these are among the most sensitive and potentially risky uses of children’s personal information. As discussed above, third-party disclosure practices remain prevalent today, albeit with different technical details and fancier names. However, the underlying risks and outcomes that COPPA seeks to control, such as allowing third parties to contact children or making the contacting of children by first parties more effective for advertising, persist.

Children’s Advocates further agree with the Commission’s proposal to not condition access to the website or online service on the third-party disclosure consent.\textsuperscript{44} Children should have access to a site or service even if their parents have not consented to the sharing of their personal information with third parties. The 1999 COPPA Rule preamble already highlighted that “the Act prohibits collecting more information than is reasonably necessary to participate in an activity, showing Congressional intent to limit information practices (such as disclosures to third parties) that do not facilitate a child’s experience at the site.”\textsuperscript{45} The proposed addition of data minimization language simply reinforces this principle. Applying the data minimization principle to the sharing of children’s data is a crucial strategy to combat the impact of commercial surveillance on children.

B. Separate parental consent should be required for all third-party disclosures, even when integral to the nature of the website or service.

Children’s Advocates disagree with the Commission’s proposal to allow an operator to make “personal information collected by an operator from a child publicly available in identifiable form by any means” without a separate parental consent if the “disclosures are integral to the nature of the website or service.”\textsuperscript{46} We firmly believe that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} 1999 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 59899.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See Federal Trade Commission, \textit{Statement of Commissioner Alvaro Bedoya, supra} note 12.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2051, 2070.
\item \textsuperscript{45} 1999 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 59899.
\item \textsuperscript{46} See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (defining “disclose or disclosure”). For the proposed language of the definition, see Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2034, 2071.
\end{itemize}
separate parental consent should be required for services, such as messaging platforms, even if the operator makes it clear that such disclosures are integral to the service.

Services that involve the public sharing of identifiable information pose significant risks to children, such as bullying, harassment, suicidal ideation, sexual predation, and self-harm. Online platforms such as virtual worlds or public forums where children adopt avatars or personas elevate their public exposure. In fact, in the United States v. Epic Games, Inc. case, the Commission itself acknowledged that default text and voice communications on Fortnite led to considerable harm for children and teenagers. As a result of default voice communications, children and teens experienced bullying, threats, and harassment and encountered disturbing topics, such as suicide. To address this harm, the proposed federal court order requires Epic Games to obtain affirmative express consent to turn on voice and text chat features for young users, thereby prohibiting a default-on setting. To ensure the safety of children, parents should be given an additional step or “speed bump” before consenting to the disclosure of their child's personal information in such a public and risky manner.

Furthermore, parents should also receive additional notice regarding the potential risks before giving consent for the public disclosure of their child’s personal information in services like public chats, public virtual worlds, or public gaming forums. Under the current rule, operators are required under 312.8 to “establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from children.” However, notice of these procedures might give parents a false sense of security regarding the safety of their child’s personal information on a platform. Operators should, therefore, have a heightened responsibility to alert parents to the risks of public disclosure, including the risk of being contacted by strangers.

C. The Commission must recognize the ubiquity of data sharing arrangements such as data clean rooms and treat them as de facto disclosure practices under COPPA.

The COPPA Rule update must address the widespread sharing of personal information between operators and third parties, as well as among third parties. The

49 16 C.F.R. § 312.8.
50 See FTC supra note 10.
current operations of the commercial surveillance online marketplace thrive not only due to widespread unregulated data collection practices, but also because of the numerous online data sharing practices, “partnerships,” and collaborations among marketers, platforms, ad tech companies, identity management companies, data brokers, and other companies that form the infrastructure and enable the audience economy in which the children’s audience plays a critical role. This audience economy is characterized by “an exceptionally complex global and interconnected marketplace of intermediaries involved in the creation, commodification, analysis, and circulation of data audiences for purposes including but not limited to digital advertising and marketing.”

Marketers aim to utilize children’s and teens’ data insights to optimize personalized and omnichannel ad targeting and user engagement, which drives the sharing arrangements among and between COPPA operators, COPPA third parties, and beyond. Privacy regulations like GDPR in Europe and CPRA in the US, along with browser changes such as Intelligent Tracking Prevention and the phasing out of third-party cookies in Chrome, have limited the usefulness and use of third-party cookies for tracking users and data analytics. In response to these changes, a significant restructuring in the digital advertising landscape is underway. Marketers in this post-cookie world are focusing on enhancing and leveraging their first-party data while also prioritizing relationships with third parties, leading to data collaboration and partnerships. This COPPA rule update must address these sharing relationships.

These third-party data processing measures can only be described as de facto data sharing arrangements. They are at the heart of the advertising economy and sweep children’s data into the audience economy with little recourse. The scope of these sharing arrangements is extensive, poorly understood, and most importantly, lacking effective regulation. The digital advertising market “comprises thousands of interconnected platforms and is projected to be worth $333 billion, in which programmatic advertising accounts for the vast majority (84.5% or more) of total revenue.” “Collaboration”, “partnerships”, or “federated collaboration” arrangements

---


53 See van der Vlist & Helmond, supra note 51.

54 See van der Vlist & Helmond, supra note 51.
between first-party data companies and marketers aim to enhance user profiles and enable precise ad targeting without relying on cookie-based identifiers.  

One way companies obscure the true nature of data processing relationships involving sharing or making data available to third parties is through the use of “data clean rooms.” These clean rooms are software environments where organizations can combine their first-party data with data from other sources, including first-party data from other organizations and third-party data purchased from data brokers. Major players in the ad-tech industry, such as Amazon, Disney, Google, Meta, Habu, LiveRamp, and Snowflake, are currently employing data clean rooms to store and analyze large volumes of data.

In the case of child-directed sites or sites where an operator has actual knowledge that they collect data from children, first-party data is collected directly from children, with or without parental consent. Other marketers, like those in the food and beverage industry, can then match their own data within “clean rooms” with those of first-party data operators. They can further enhance it with other sources, such as data purchased from data brokers. Data clean rooms serve multiple purposes, including providing insights into audiences and segmentations, measuring and attributing campaign effectiveness, and creating audience models and activations, such as developing look-alike models for targeted marketing.

The ad targeting system now deployed by the Walt Disney Company illustrates how data from children is swept up into this “advanced advertising” process. Disney specifically identifies “kids” as one of its “streaming video offerings,” citing its Disney XP and Disney+ services. Disney Digital, for example, claims that it “is a source of

---

60 For example, Disney states that “Disney Channel is the #1 Cable Network with Girls 6-11 for the 53rd straight quarter” and that “Disney Junior is the #1 24-Hour Preschool Network for 37th straight quarter.
everyday magic and provides brand partners with unparalleled social reach and engagement. With 550+ Brand, Franchise, and Character handles, we are the premiere digital destination for kids and families!"61

Like other leading digital marketers, Disney’s data solutions involve gathering and integrating multiple data points to create its proprietary Audience Graph. This graph, “one of the largest graphs available,” “consists of millions of households, CTV, and digital device IDs.... It is continually refined and enhanced based on the numerous ways Disney connects with consumers daily[.]”62 Disney states that it gathers data on “110 million households” and “260 million device IDs,” allowing it to offer “proprietary 1st party segments” and via clean rooms that enable a “match back to advertisers 1st party or licensed data set.”63 For instance, Disney uses the Snowflake Data Cloud as a “clean room,” offering nearly 140 brands a secure location to access data on hundreds of customer segments across Disney’s entertainment services and place ads across Disney’s media.64 Using the Audience Graph, advertisers can leverage more than 100,000 audience attributes and nearly 2,000 ad category segments for insights, planning, activation, measurement, and attribution across Disney properties. Additionally, Disney employs various internal and external partner audience measurement applications, including the Active Attention Index, which “uses proprietary technology and metrics to analyze and score video creatives...[to] measure engagement down to individual objects in a video [and] organic actions taken by the end user...”65

The combination of Disney’s own data targeting system, the continuous influx of data from Disney+ and its other networks, and the utilization of “advertiser data” across multiple marketing verticals enables precise audience targeting and segmentation, as well as the capability to reach unified audiences across all screens.66 Apart from Snowflake, Disney’s clean room partnerships involve Google Cloud, Amazon (AWS) and Habu, along with collaborations with leading consumer data-holding and ad targeting

61 Id.
63 Technology Innovation, Disney, supra note 62.
66 Technology Innovation, Disney, supra note 62.
Roblox is also involved in collaborative data sharing strategies. Roblox, whose Q3 2023 data shows that 42.3% (29.7 million) of Roblox daily active users were under 13 years old, announced in 2023 its new marketing Partner Program, granting access to tools and data to a select group of seven companies. These companies include in-game creator studios, agencies focused on the Web3 and metaverse space, and the agency holding company Dentsu. This move follows a successful advertising strategy adopted by other platforms, such as Snapchat and TikTok. Roblox aims to make the “immersive advertising” format appealing to brands, envisioning that eventually, all brands will have a presence on their platform.

Snapchat, popular among young audiences, also engages in various marketing “partnerships” that effectively involve the sharing of personal information of its young audience. Many Snapchat marketing partners have access to Snapchat data for matching purposes, audience modeling and targeting, and other data analytics to
enhance advertising efficiency. Last year, Snapchat announced its partnership with Microsoft on ads in the ‘My AI’ chatbot feature. For instance, Snapchat partnered with Microsoft on ads in the ‘My AI’ chatbot feature and is testing sponsored links in user chats that match the chat content. Snap partners with Microsoft, which in turn curates a network of agency and brand partnerships, including Microsoft Advertising’s Ads for Chat API and Microsoft Advertising Network for retailers. The retail network “enables businesses to set up and run their own retail media programs by providing access to Microsoft’s existing demand, ad-supply and audience of high-intent shoppers.” By funneling ads through the Microsoft Advertising Network, advertisers can more easily deploy and scale their ad business in a fragmented landscape. Instead of making arrangements with each individual retailer or retail network, an advertiser can reach a broader audience across all channels via the Microsoft Advertising Network. These complex “partnership” arrangements between Snapchat, Microsoft, and brand advertisers involve data analytics across a variety of data sets, resulting in targeting through some form of identifier that must be considered sharing of personal information under COPPA.

Many other child-facing digital media platforms and services have also incorporated data targeting collaborations, “clean room” practices, and identity data regimes, as well as state of the art real-time measurement practices. Platforms such as Disney and ad tech providers claim that the use of clean rooms can be done in a privacy preserving way and that consent has been secured. We disagree and consider these practices de-facto sharing. This claim must be debunked and exposed.

Under COPPA, data clean rooms and associated practices should only be allowed with a separate parental consent for disclosures to third parties, as required under 312.5(a)(2). Data clean room providers may claim to protect users’ privacy, but the effects they produce after datasets are shared and matched speak for themselves.

---


75 Baar, supra note 74.
Platforms and marketers use these techniques to improve their data insights, enlarge their child audience, target children more effectively, and contact them with greater precision. In other words, the result of data clean room practices preserves the status quo of commercial surveillance. What was once considered high-risk sharing is now supposedly “clean” and privacy-friendly, but this is not the case. Deploying data clean rooms is one of the “privacy preserving” designs among “encrypted” identity solutions, “anonymous” ad attribution solutions, and “privacy-safe” optimization via machine learning. These strategies, as identified by McGuigan et al. in an important paper, allow the industry to escape meaningful regulation by shifting the focus to privacy and technology solutions.\(^\text{76}\) This rhetorical pivot and focus on techno-solutionism enable the industry to maintain its “flows of data and means of identification to enable still-desired targeting, measurement, and optimization.” Therefore, for the purpose of this rulemaking, the Commission must consider these clean room practices as “sharing.”

Even among privacy professionals, data clean rooms raise more questions than answers.\(^\text{77}\) Noga Rosenthal, Chief Privacy Officer and General Counsel at Ampersand, expressed her confusion about their ability to solve the identity and cookie issues: “I couldn't figure it out,” she said to the IAPP.\(^\text{78}\) The matching of data sets in clean rooms requires some form of ID solution, which can potentially lead to privacy violations. The risk of privacy violations is exacerbated when the parties involved in this process have different definitions of privacy. The attempt by the Interactive Advertising Bureau to standardize the usage of data clean rooms acknowledges that data enrichment of first-party datasets occurs through the matching of datasets and “match keys (such as user email addresses).”\(^\text{79}\) The IAB acknowledges that the primary purpose of a data clean room is to enable the ability to target the resulting overlap.\(^\text{80}\) Critics also conclude that clean rooms preserve the ability for industry to “continue granular level targeting.”\(^\text{81}\) Despite the industry’s efforts to “sanitize surveillance,” data clean rooms and associated practices must be considered forms of disclosure under COPPA and must only be permissible with parental consent.

\(^{76}\) See generally McGuigan et al., supra note 58.

\(^{77}\) See Duball, supra note 56.


\(^{80}\) See Duball, supra note 56.

\(^{81}\) See McGuigan et al., supra note 58, at 7. See also Interactive Advertising Bureau Tech Lab, supra note 79.
D. To curtail contemporary first-party operator data sharing practices, the Commission should clarify the definition of “release.”

In the 2013 rulemaking procedures, Children’s Advocates emphasized the significance of persistent identifiers in the marketing practices of Big Tech and marketers. These identifiers not only allow for the tracking of online users across sites and channels but also enable practices such as “data mining,” or the “merging,” “matching,” or “combining” of first-party operator data with marketing partners and other third parties. These practices enhance marketing and targeting outcomes and help to “activate” new audiences.82 As mentioned above, these data practices are fundamental to the audience economy and facilitate the unrestricted flow of data. It is crucial that the rulemaking process fully addresses the uses of persistent identifiers and places constraints on companies to prevent them from contacting children, engaging in behavioral advertising, building profiles on children, or utilizing the data for any other purpose.

The proper reading of the meaning of “disclose or disclosure” and that of “release” is central in the effort to provide parents the proper controls to curtail the rampant disclosures of their children’s data to third parties. According to the current regulation, these disclosures between businesses are defined as follows:

Disclose or disclosure means, with respect to personal information:
(1) The release of personal information collected by an operator from a child in identifiable form for any purpose, except where an operator provides such information to a person who provides support for the internal operations of the Website or online service.[.]83

It further defines the word “release:” Release of personal information means the sharing, selling, renting, or transfer of personal information to any third party.84

These definitions need to be updated to reflect current sharing practices. In 1998 when COPPA was passed, marketers primarily relied on selling data and purchasing or renting mailing lists to reach their target audience. Such an understanding is out of step with contemporary sharing practices. The 2013 final rule moved the definition of “release” out of the definition of “disclose or disclosure” and in the process dropped

---

83 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
84 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
crucial language: it removed “any other means of providing personal information to any third party.”\textsuperscript{85} We strongly recommend that the Commission reinstates this language to acknowledge and address the various ways in which operators and third parties can share information in the present day.

Adding language such as “providing access to” and "for targeted advertising across different contexts" to the definition of "selling" clarified that consumers have the option to opt-out of sharing their personal information when it comes to the “matching” and “combining” of their data in data clean rooms. The FTC should also clarify the meaning of "release" to align with the digital era and offer parents effective choices to restrict the disclosure of their children’s data for marketing purposes to third parties via data clean rooms.

E. To further protect children's privacy and minimize the sharing of personal information with third parties, the Commission should affirm that the sharing of personal information is limited to the specified purpose.

Sharing children’s data with third parties inherently increases the risk to their privacy. The Commission should provide further clarification on how to minimize these risks when sharing a child’s personal information based on consent. The Commission can do this by requiring operators to clearly state which data will be used for what purpose and with which entity, emphasizing that the third party is bound to those specified uses only. Additionally, the Commission should clarify that disclosures can only be made to entities listed in the notice to parents.

We welcome the Commission’s proposal under 312.4 (c)(1)(iv) to “require that operators sharing personal information with third parties identify the third parties as well as the purposes for such sharing, should the parent provide consent.” Informed consent can only occur when there is transparency and the parent is fully informed of the who, how, and potential consequences of the consent. Therefore, we support the notion that parents must know the purpose of sharing and the identity of the entity with whom the operator intends to share the data. As Children’s Advocates discuss in Section V, the notice should also clearly state which specific personal information elements or categories of personal information will be shared and for what purpose (as well as with which entity). Additionally, the Commission should clarify that data shared for a particular purpose can only be used for that specified purpose and must not be used for any other purposes. No secondary uses should be allowed for the designated entity. Without these additional provisions, sharing will continue to proliferate without any

\textsuperscript{85} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule, 76 FR 59804, 59809 (Proposed Sept. 9, 2011) (Codified at 16 C.F.R 312). It previously read: “(1) Release of personal information means the sharing, selling, renting, or any other means of providing personal information to any third party[.]”
limits, leading to a free-for-all for third parties, especially ad tech companies, as we currently observe. Only with these specifications can we consider a notice as "complete" and truly descriptive of the “operator’s personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices.” 86 This type of notice will prevent any confusion regarding the specification of purposes and limitations on data usage.

We support the proposal for Section 312.8 to clarify that an “operator that releases personal information to third parties or other operators must obtain written assurances that the recipients will employ reasonable measures to maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of the information.” The written assurance should also specify the details of the disclosure, including the sole purpose(s) for which personal information was released and the recipient entity. This would not only enhance the security of the data but also protect children’s privacy.

Furthermore, the Commission can minimize privacy risks for third-party disclosures by clarifying that disclosures can only be made to entities listed in the notice. This means that consent for sharing personal information with a specific brand, such as Disney Parks and Resorts, for example, does not imply consent for The Walt Disney Family of Companies to share the data across its multiple brands, subsidiaries, and other legal entities unless specified. 87 A reasonable parent would not expect their consent to result in their child’s data being shared throughout the entire conglomerate when they simply consented to disclosing data to one brand. Along the same lines, Children’s Advocates would also urge the Commission to prohibit the onward sharing of personal data to fourth and fifth parties. Anything else would undermine the specified consent. Alternatively, the notice requirement in 312.4(c) should mention that operators have to mention the possibility of the onward disclosure of the child’s data with multiple parties.

III. The third-party notice and consent requirement must also apply to persons or entities who collect personal information on a child-directed site or service, or on a mixed audience site when they do not act as operator with actual knowledge.

Children’s Advocates support the Commission’s proposal that the third-party disclosure consent should also apply to “disclosures of persistent identifiers for targeted advertising purposes, as well as disclosure of other personal information for marketing or other purposes” where the entity collecting data is not an operator with actual

86 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(a); 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b) (detailing what it means to “obtain verifiable consent”).
knowledge. The Commission must clarify that a child-directed content provider is strictly liable as operator for releasing children’s personal information to such an entity or person and that they can only do so with separate parental consent.

A. **The Commission must address personal data collection through so-called “third-party trackers” and “plug-ins” and ensure that they are covered under the third-party disclosure consent when they are not operators.**

Several studies have established that the collection of personal information of children via so-called “third-party” trackers or “plug-ins” is pervasive. Advocates’ 2012 COPPA Rule filing identified tracking via beacons and cookies, including flash cookies, as a pervasive problem on children’s websites. This problem only increased in dimension over the past 12 years and is one of the key factors in the commercial surveillance of children. In 2018, a study showed that the majority of the most popular free children’s apps in the United States were potentially in violation of COPPA, “mainly due to their use of third-party software development kits (SDKs).” These SDK configurations enabled the tracking and behavioral targeting of children. The collection of children’s data via trackers is particularly problematic in the educational setting. Common Sense Media reports that approximately 47% of ed tech services collect personal and non-personal data for third-party marketing services via trackers.

These practices have proliferated despite the existence of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and the 2013 Rule update which aimed to address tracking, plug-ins, and persistent identifiers. We have witnessed an ever expanding loophole under COPPA where personal information is “collected from children through child-directed properties with no one responsible for such collection.” This has resulted in an entrenched surveillance infrastructure and increased commercial surveillance of children online since. Consequently, it has caused countless privacy harms as well as a cascade of related harms such as mental health and physical harms, discrimination, manipulation, and safety risks. Tragically, these harms have even resulted in the loss of children’s lives in numerous cases. Meanwhile, the leading commercial surveillance

---

88 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2051.
89 Center for Digital Democracy et al., Comment on Proposed Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule at 17 (2012).
90 Reyes et al., *Won’t Somebody Think of the Children?* Examining COPPA Compliance at Scale, 63 PoPETS 63, 63 (2018), https://petsymposium.org/popets/2018/popets-2018-0021.pdf. Mobile application developers use SDKs in their software to integrate services offered by other companies, such as services to monetize their apps through advertisement. For an explanation of SDKs, see Mobile SDKs: Exploring the Key to In-App Advertising and Monetization, Start.io (Aug. 24, 2023), https://www.start.io/blog/mobile-sdk-exploring-the-key-to-in-app-advertising-and-monetization/.
92 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule Amendments at 3976.
companies continue to profit from the highly lucrative children’s digital data marketplace.

Where it proves difficult to establish whether an entity that collects personal information via plug-ins or persistent identifiers either (1) has actual knowledge that the site or service it collects from is directed to children, or (2) that the entity has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child (in short: “has actual knowledge”), that entity must be considered a third party. As the Commission already stated in the 2012 rule making, we “do not believe Congress intended the loophole advocated by many in industry: Personal information being collected from children through child-directed properties with no one responsible for such collection.” In other words, when an entity collects personal information on a site or service without obtaining consent directly or through a designated operator (and thereby establishing itself as an operator with actual knowledge), the entity acquires personal information from children through the release of that information by the primary child-directed content provider (primary operator).

B. Child-directed content providers that allow another person or online service to collect personal information through their sites are strictly liable for that collection and bear strict liability and can only release that information or make it available to third parties with parental consent.

The Commission made it clear in the 2012 final rule that child-directed content providers who allow other online services to collect personal information through their sites are strictly liable for that collection. In other words, the primary operator assumes strict liability for releasing this information to the third party when they grant permission to those entities or persons to gather personal information from users of the primary operator's website or online service.

As the Commission concluded in the 2013 final rule: “the primary-content site or service is in the best position to know which plug-ins it integrates into its site, and is also in the best position to give notice[.]” In 2018, Reyes et al. found that a majority of

---

93 Unfortunately, the Commission has been proven wrong that “the actual knowledge standard it is adopting will likely be met in most cases when...[,]” 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule at 3978.
94 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule Amendments at 3976.
95 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d)(1). The rule allows for a single operator designee.
96 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule Amendments at 3975.
97 The rule defines an operator as an entity that “benefits by allowing another person to collect personal information directly from users of such [website] or online service.” § 312.2. “Another person” here could also read “third party.” “Person” is not defined in the rule. § 312.2 The NPRM proposes to remove the word “directly.” Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, at 2047.
98 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule Amendments, at 3977.
children's apps potentially violated COPPA due to their use of third-party Software Development Kits (SDKs). However, the authors also found that companies and app developers have access to tools that can identify if SDKs collect children’s personal data in violation of COPPA. What was true then is certainly true now: first-party operators have the capability to identify which entities collect personal information on their site or service and ascertain if said entities function as operators with knowledge or as third parties.

In practice, this means that if an entity who is not “an agent or service provider of the operator” collects personal information from users of an operator’s website or online service, they must be listed as either an operator with actual knowledge or as a third party to whom the primary operator discloses personal information. This must be disclosed in the new notice requirements under the NPRM. In either case, verified parental consent will be required. The personal data could be collected by a third-party tracker, who would then be strictly liable for all COPPA obligations as an operator. Alternatively, the entity could act as a third party to whom the primary operator releases personal information. As noted above, we recommend that the Commission clarifies the meaning of “release” to also capture the circumstances where a primary operator makes personal data available to these kinds of third parties. This will allow parents to decide whether they want their children’s personal information to be obtained for targeted advertising, marketing, or other purposes, effectively closing the COPPA loophole.

IV. The Commission should place limits on the support for the internal operations exception, including limits related to engagement maximization, advertising attribution, and “contextual” advertising.

The COPPA Rule’s internal operations exception currently allows operators to collect personal information from a child for specific purposes without complying with all of COPPA’s notice and consent requirements. The exception applies to activities necessary to perform an enumerated list of internal functions, “[s]o long as the information collected for the activities listed... is not used or disclosed to contact a specific individual, including through behavioral advertising, to amass a profile on a specific individual, or for any other purpose.” Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to exclude engagement-maximizing practices and advertising attribution from the exception.

99 Reyes et al., Won’t Somebody Think of the Children?” supra note 89.
100 Id. at 77.
101 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(c)(1)(iv).
102 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
A. The Commission should exclude activities that maximize engagement, including platform-driven content personalization activities, from the internal operations exception.

As Advocates Center for Digital Democracy and Fairplay have highlighted in previous filings with the Commission, engagement-maximizing techniques pose particular risks when used on minors, who are more developmentally vulnerable to features and functions designed to extend their use of a website or service. Minors’ heightened sensitivity to immediate and social rewards, coupled with nascent executive function skills related to “impulse control, decision-making, attentional flexibility, planning, self-regulation, and resistance to interference,” make it particularly difficult for children to resist prompts to return to or stay on a platform. Accordingly, Children’s Advocates agree with the Commission’s proposal to add language to the internal operations use exception that “prohibit[s] operators that use this exception from using or disclosing personal information in connection with processes, including machine learning processes, that encourage or prompt use of a website or online service.” Using a child’s personal data to exploit these vulnerabilities via notifications or nudges exceeds the limited practical purposes for which the internal operations exception is intended.

Pursuant to Questions 9 and 15, Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to add other engagement-maximizing techniques to this prohibition, all of which are closely related to platform-driven content personalization.

The internal operations exception allows an operator to “personalize the content on” a platform, and the Commission asks when content personalization should be considered user-driven as opposed to operator-driven. The Commission should limit permissible content personalization to choices affirmatively made by a child user to direct or guide an activity. For example, a child’s selection of an avatar or skin for their character in a game is a user-driven personalization made by the child. Using a personal identifier to effectuate that choice, made autonomously by the user, across pages ensures the activity functions as the user intended. This is consistent with information currently provided in the Commission’s COPPA FAQs: “The inclusion of personalization within the definition of support for internal operations was intended to permit operators to maintain user-driven preferences, such as game scores, or character choices in virtual

---

104 Id. at 54-60.
106 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.
worlds.”108 We encourage the Commission to include these and similar examples in the final Rule to ensure platforms understand what choices are user-driven.

By contrast, operator-driven personalizations such as algorithmic content recommendations implicate the very data surveillance and targeting practices COPPA is designed to protect against. Platforms should not be permitted under the internal operations exception to utilize machine learning, predictive models, or other data-driven techniques to recommend content or otherwise personalize a child user’s experience. As Advocates have previously outlined, personalized content recommendations inevitably involve user profiling, which creates the risk of significant privacy and other downstream harms to children.109 This is true whether a platform is leveraging an individual user’s personal data to build a profile of that user or using session data to engage in content analysis, as described in more detail below. Ultimately, operator-driven personalizations are targeted at maximizing engagement or other metrics selected by a platform, regardless of whether the personalization supports the user’s autonomous use of the site or service.

Personalized variable rewards are an example of an operator-driven engagement maximizing technique. As Advocates Center for Digital Democracy, Fairplay, et al. outlined in their Petition for Rulemaking on engagement maximization, low-friction variable rewards are:

(i) Rewarding content or virtual items offered by a website or service that:
   (1) Are awarded to users for mere scrolling, tapping, and/or opening or logging into the website or service;
   (2) Vary unpredictably in type, amount, and/or timing; and
   (3) Generally increase as a minor spends more time on the website or service, or visits it more frequently.110

These rewards are explicitly designed using sophisticated computational techniques and neuroscience to invoke a dopamine response in the brain at random intervals, thereby keeping users on platforms longer.111 TikTok’s For You Page, which recommends an

---

endless stream of posts to the user, “encourage[s] compulsive usage.” And the company “will at times delay a video it knows a user will like until the moment before it anticipates the user would otherwise log out.” Meta’s data scientists have similarly said they use intermittent variable rewards to drive user activity. Such personalization, which is intended to increase platform revenues, falls squarely outside of the purpose of COPPA’s internal operations exception. Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to prohibit operators from using the content personalization category of the internal operations exception to engage in data-driven variable rewards techniques, including the delivery of game tokens or prizes, video, photos, and post reactions.

B. Advertising attribution should not fall under the internal operations exception.

Children’s Advocates urge the Commission, as they did in 2019, to prohibit platforms from engaging in ad attribution under the internal operations exception. Under modern marketing practices, ad attribution inevitably involves user profiling and all of its attendant risks. In order to ensure COPPA meets its intended purpose of protecting children from data collection without notice and increasing parents’ knowledge of data surveillance practices, the Commission should exclude these attribution techniques from the internal operations exception.

Marketers are employing sophisticated machine learning models to engage in ad attribution. Google’s Performance Max and Meta’s Advantage+ Shopping Campaigns, among others, use black-box artificial intelligence to target marketers’ ad campaigns based on their own first-party data. Through these tools, companies like Meta use machine learning to generate and deploy ads estimated to be most effective. While

---

113 Id. at 26-27.
115 Center for Digital Democracy, Fairplay et al., Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 22, at 51-52.
117 See Hannah Murphy & Cristina Criddel, Meta’s AI-driven Advertising System Splits Marketers, Fin. Times (Feb. 28, 2023), https://www.ft.com/content/fc95aof7-5e4e-4616-9b17-7b72daee6c60.
these systems may not use third-party cookie tracking, they still pose serious profiling and privacy threats. Advertising and media expert Lee McGuigan et al. explain of Performance Max:

Google in 2021 announced plans to shift to using “data-driven attribution,” which substitutes industry standard “last-click” attribution methods with algorithmic models designed to infer the connection between impressions and user activity in the absence of the data that cookies or other identifiers provide (Srinivasan, 2020). As one trade publication describes it, “Data-driven attribution may not be more privacy-compliant than last-click [attribution], in and of itself[.]” Though this data is probabilistic, and does not contain personal identifiable information, it nevertheless retains the information asymmetries that characterize other models in behavioral advertising, in many ways concentrating these asymmetries even further by positioning Google’s algorithmic models as the ground truth on which publishers and advertisers can evaluate the effectiveness of their placements.

The use of personal identifiers to profile and target children through these sophisticated tools and report success metrics back to marketers threatens children’s privacy by subjecting them to precise targeting. Ultimately, we support the Commission’s analysis that “if the information collected to perform the activity is used or disclosed ‘to contact a specific individual, including through behavioral advertising, to amass a profile on a specific individual, or for any other purpose,’” it falls outside the bounds of the internal operations exception, and we urge the Commission to recognize the profiling and privacy risks clearly associated with modern ad attribution technology.

C. The Commission should remove contextual advertising from the internal operations exception and define contextual and behavioral advertising in the Rule.

In Question 10, the Commission asks whether it should consider changes to the Rule’s treatment of contextual advertising. First and foremost, Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to reconsider contextual advertising’s inclusion in the internal operations exception. Ultimately, so-called “contextual” advertising today far exceeds the limits of its print analog. The Commission should remove contextual advertising from the internal operations exception, which applies specifically to personal identifiers, and clearly define contextual advertising under the Rule. It should further define data-

---

118 See McGuigan et al., supra note 58, at 8-9.
119 Id.
driven or “behavioral” advertising to clearly distinguish contextual advertising from other forms.

The inclusion of contextual advertising in the internal operations exception defies the logic of “contextual” ads. This form of advertising is theoretically limited to keywords based on the content of a page, such as its words and images. As soon as a so-called contextual ad is paired with a persistent identifier (which is the purpose of the internal operations exception under COPPA), it becomes a form of data-driven advertising that should not, pursuant to COPPA’s core purpose, be conducted without parental consent. For this reason, Advocates advise that the Commission reconsider its inclusion in the internal operations exception altogether.

Further, marketers are increasingly expanding the practice of “contextual” advertising to include sophisticated data surveillance that poses the same risks of behavioral advertising.121 Through modern data tracking and machine learning, marketers are collecting location data,122 analyzing subconscious feelings,123 and profiling user cohorts,124 all under the umbrella of “contextual” advertising. For example, Uber’s “journey ads,” which allow marketers to target riders based on their ride destination, clearly involve a user’s location data, but the company describes this program as “contextual.”125 Marketers are offering advertisers new forms of “privacy-protective” targeting by profiling cohorts or affinity groups through opt-in programs. Playground XYZ offers YouTube advertising optimization based on data from eye tracking panels.126 Marketers characterize these practices as “ways to target ads without relying on user data,”127 but surveillance of session or device-level data raises the same privacy risks as so-called behavioral advertising. Users’ choices can be manipulated when they are targeted based on the personal information of themselves and other

---

125 Schiff, supra note 121.
127 Cantu, supra note 123.
users. Further, these allegedly privacy-protecting practices still reveal sensitive details about a person.

The Commission can address this market-driven redefinition of contextual advertising by defining both contextual and behavioral advertising in Section 312.2 of the Rule. Contextual should be defined as marketing via keyword inclusion or exclusion based on the content of the website or service. The Commission should make clear that contextual advertising is mutually exclusive from behavioral advertising. Behavioral should be defined as marketing based on (1) a minor’s personal information; (2) the personal data of a group of minors who share identity characteristics with the minor; (3) psychological or other profiling of a minor or group of minors; or (4) a unique device identifier. Together, these four prongs protect users against the privacy-invasive profiling, device fingerprinting, and cohort analysis described above.

V. The Commission should strengthen the notice requirements and ensure that COPPA’s data minimization and purpose specification requirements are effectuated via privacy notices and consent disclosures.

Privacy policies can play an important role in ensuring that businesses comply with data minimization requirements and adhere to Fair Information Practices (FIPs), including the principles of purpose specification and use limitation. Therefore, the Commission should strengthen its notice requirement to compel companies to adopt a more comprehensive data minimization approach and ensure compliance with other FIPs. Additionally, the new notice requirement for separate consent for disclosures with third parties should be improved to promote transparency and clarity and differentiate it clearly from parental consent for data collection. Many privacy policy disclosures fail to meet existing Rule requirements for clarity and user-friendliness. The Commission should ensure proper enforcement of both existing and proposed notice requirements.

A. To ensure that operators follow COPPA’s data minimization and purpose specification requirements, the Commission should mandate that operators offer clear and specific notices describing their data practices.

Children’s Advocates strongly believe that relying solely on a “notice and consent” approach to safeguarding children online is inadequate, and we have supported legislation to move beyond this approach. However, privacy notices still have an

129 Many commenters have supported the Kids Online Safety Act and American Data Privacy Protection Act. See, e.g., Pass KOSA https://www.passkosa.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2024); Fairplay, Fairplay statement on the advancement of the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (July 20, 2022)
important role to play and can serve crucial functions. They are particularly significant in ensuring compliance with provisions of COPPA, and to a lesser extent, in helping parents make informed choices.

Section I above discusses the Rule’s requirements for data minimization regarding data collection, use, and retention. Section I also explains that adherence to COPPA’s data minimization provisions requires the Commission to clarify that operators must also adhere to the principles of purpose specification and use limitation. Effective data minimization involves collecting and retaining only the minimum amount of data necessary to fulfill a specific purpose. In other words, an operator must organize its data collection by determining a specific use purpose or purposes for each data element or data category. Then, the operator must identify the minimum amount of data required for each purpose. Finally, the operator must apply the use limitation principle, i.e. ensuring data is only used for the purpose originally specified and not for a secondary purpose (and in the case of COPPA, not for any purpose to which a parent has not consented).

Only through this approach can the operator comply with COPPA’s Section 312.7, which prohibits the conditioning of a child’s participation in a website or online service on the collection of “more personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in such activity.”\(^{130}\) Similarly, Section 312.10 currently states that “An operator... shall retain personal information for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected.” The proposed Rule update adds “and not for a secondary purpose.” In other words, data minimization requirements can only be realized if an operator implements processes and disclosures that specify data purposes and that set data use limitations for collected data.

A properly articulated privacy notice can play a crucial role in ensuring that operators adhere to COPPA’s data minimization requirement and other important Fair Information Practices. The Statute and the Rule call for an operator to identify what information the operator collects from children and “how the operator uses such information.”\(^{131}\) The Commission proposes to update the notice requirements in various places. The operator must specify “how” the operator intends to use personal information for internal operations, for example, and must list the purposes for disclosures of personal information with third parties. These additions help to identify use purposes at the time of collection or sharing. The Commission should add to this a requirement that operators tie specific data elements to particular uses or purposes. By

---

\(^{130}\) 16 C.F.R. § 312.7.

\(^{131}\) 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d)(2); See also 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b).
requiring operators to adhere to the important principle of purpose specification, data can then also be limited to particular uses, and data minimization realized. By clarifying these and other requirements, the Commission more effectively protects children’s privacy, which is a fundamental goal of COPPA.\textsuperscript{132}

A review of current notice practices shows that it is impossible for parents and advocates to know whether operators are complying with Section 312.7’s data minimization requirement. As demonstrated in Appendix A, infra, platforms use vague policies that do not specify how an operator will use data for a specific purpose. For example, TikTok’s policy says:\textsuperscript{133}

\section*{What Information We Collect from Children}

When a Child registers for TikTok, we collect only limited information, including username, password, and birthday.

Similarly, the policy that Microsoft links to on the website for Minecraft, a game popular with children, says:\textsuperscript{134}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}

36
These policies and other notices and provisions cited in the appendix below are wholly insufficient. They do not provide transparency around data uses and data minimization practices. Today’s privacy policy practices thus perpetuate the underenforcement of COPPA’s data minimization requirement. Because parents and advocates cannot properly evaluate the notices, they cannot alert the Commission when operators are out of compliance.

To strengthen the data minimization requirement for data collection and to incorporate purpose specification and use limitation principles into operators’ data practices, the Commission should strengthen the rule and clarify that an operator’s notice should, at a minimum, contain the features outlined below.

**Features that should be added to the content of the website or online service notice, 312.4(d):**

1. The notice should clearly inform users that regardless of their consent for data collection, the operator will only collect data reasonably necessary for the stated purposes, including for internal operations.\[^{135}\]
2. We agree with the Commission’s addition under 312.4(d)(2) to require operators to provide more information about their disclosure practices

---

\[^{135}\] See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.7, 312.10. For further discussion, see Section I, supra.
and retention policies. As proposed by the Commission for 312.10, the operator should state that it will not retain personal information longer than is reasonably necessary for the specified purpose for which the data was collected, and also not for any other purpose. The notice should state that the operator will make a data retention policy available upon request.

3. Children’s Advocates join the Commission in highlighting the existing rule requirement under 312.4 d(2) that operators must describe how they use personal information collected from children. To implement the data minimization requirement, this provision is important. However, we would like to see more clarity added by tying each personal data element to its stated purposes. The rule could be edited in this way:

A description of what personal information the operator collects from children, including whether the website or online service enables a child to make personal information publicly available and how the operator uses such information. The operator must specify a use purpose for each personal data element, or categories of personal data collected.

We suggest adding “categories of personal data” instead of listing a long list of individual data elements for clarity. The Commission should also specify that “each category of personal information shall be written in a manner that provides consumers a meaningful understanding of the information being collected”\textsuperscript{136} or the Commission itself should define those categories.

4. We are proposing that in addition to a security program, operators also implement a privacy program. Any significant risks identified via these programs (see Section IX) should be disclosed to the parent here as well.

5. We strongly endorse the Commission’s proposal for § 312.4(d)(3) to “specify the particular internal operation(s)” for which an operator has collected a persistent identifier. We recommend that the Commission further delineate that an operator must “specify each particular internal operation(s) purpose or activity for each identifier” listed under the definition of “support for the internal operations of the Web site or online service” (312.2). These changes would facilitate the operator’s adherence to the collection data minimization requirement and principles of purpose specification and use limitation which also apply to data uses for internal operations.

\textsuperscript{136} California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations, Art. 1 § 7012(e)(1) (Mar. 29, 2023).
6. We also strongly support the Commission’s proposal under 312.4(d)(4) and would like to see the Commission add specificity here as well, clarifying that each personal data element or category of personal data elements must have a linked identifiable purpose. The Rule could be edited in this way:

“Where the operator collects audio files containing a child’s voice pursuant to § 312.5(c)(9), a description of how the operator’s uses purpose for each such audio file or for each category of audio file and that...[.]”

**Features that should be added to the content of the direct notice to parents, 312.4(c):**

1. Children’s Advocates agree with all the Commission’s proposed changes in § 312.4(c)(1)(iii), and in particular, the requirement that the direct notice must include how the operator intends to use the personal information collected from a child. This addition makes it consistent with the requirements for the (d)(2) website or online service notice and would help with the operator’s compliance with the data minimization requirements. As already outlined above for section 312.4(d), however, we would like to see more clarity added by tying each personal data element or categories of personal data to a stated purpose. Our proposed edit is as follows:

   (iii) The items of personal information the operator intends to collect from the child, how the operator intends to use each item such information, and...”

2. We are proposing that in addition to a security program, operators also implement a privacy program. Any significant risks identified via these programs (see Section IX) should be disclosed in the direct notice to the parent prior to seeking consent.

As Children’s Advocates outline in Appendix B, *infra*, many COPPA privacy policy disclosures fail to meet existing Rule requirements. They do not satisfy COPPA’s mandate to craft notices that are “clearly and understandably written and complete” without material that is “unrelated, confusing, or self-contradictory.”137 Many list data uses without tying them to particular elements of personal information or categories of personal information. They do not give parents the information necessary to make fully

137 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(a).
informed decisions about their children’s data. The Commission should more vigorously enforce basic disclosure requirements. Additionally, the Commission should consider ways to make notices more helpful to parents. For example, operators should be required to identify privacy risks or other potential safety concerns resulting from their privacy and security program assessment.\(^{138}\) (see Section IX). Standardizing policy language and formats would allow parents and advocates to compare policies more easily, benefiting both parents and COPPA enforcement. Terms and definitions should be aligned with the Rule and be explained to parents in plain terms in the Web notice. Without user-friendly notices, parents and advocates cannot properly evaluate notices, nor can the Commission enforce COPPA compliance.

B. The Commission should provide more specific requirements for third party disclosure consent notices.

Children’s Advocates fully support the Commission’s proposal to implement a separate parental consent requirement for disclosures with third parties.\(^ {139}\) However, we believe that the notice requirements proposed by the Commission should be strengthened.

We strongly support the Commission’s proposal to have operators under 312.4 (c)(1)(iv) state the purposes for sharing personal information in the direct notice to parents and prohibit conditioning access to the website or online service on such consent.\(^ {140}\) However, we believe that the notice to parents could be more precise. The consent request should clearly state which personal information element or which category of personal information will be shared with which third party and for what purpose. Lumping personal data, purposes for sharing, and third parties together does not provide parents with a proper opportunity for informed consent. The notice should also state that the third party can only use the child’s personal information for the stated purpose for which it was shared. These notice requirements should facilitate the operators’ adherence to purpose specification and use limitation best practices.

As explained in Section II above, we disagree with the carve out for “disclosures integral to the nature of the website or online service” and would remove it in this notice section under 312.4 (c)(1)(iv). However, parents should also receive additional notice regarding the potential risks before giving consent for the public disclosure of their child’s personal information in services like public chats, public virtual worlds, or public gaming forums.

\(^{138}\) See Section IX, \textit{infra}.

\(^{139}\) See Sections II and III, \textit{infra}.

\(^{140}\) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2073.
We agree with the Commission’s proposal to have operators under 312.4 (c)(1)(iv) individually identify all third parties with whom they share children’s personal information.\textsuperscript{141} Currently, operator practices are inconsistent. YouTube Kids does not name any third parties, but states that it “may provide individual user information to [its] affiliates or other trusted businesses or persons” for processing.\textsuperscript{142} TikTok states that information may be shared with its “corporate group or service providers as necessary.”\textsuperscript{143} Budge offers categories of types third parties with whom it shares data,\textsuperscript{144} such as “service providers,” who provide analytics, “partners,” who engage in joint marketing and co-branding, and “affiliates,” who may receive information “for their own business purposes.”\textsuperscript{145} These phrases do not have clear or generally-accepted definitions. Vague terms like “affiliates” thwart a parent’s ability to fully assess the operator’s notice and give their consent.

As an alternative to requiring operators to individually identify third parties, the Commission proposed that operators use categories of third parties. However, as noted above, third party categories obscure an operator’s data practices from a parent’s genuine evaluation. We advise the Commission to maintain its original proposal and require individual identification of third parties by name, organized by category, as defined by the FTC. This requirement provides the necessary specificity that allows parents and advocates to evaluate an operator’s practices for personal comfort and legal compliance. The Commission should prescribe categories itself and require operators to use the Commission’s definitions of each category in their notices.\textsuperscript{146} By using predefined categories, operators will no longer be able to use meaningless terms or non-specific examples to disguise their practices. Furthermore, operators should be required to describe entities also in terms of their legal status under COPPA otherwise an entity’s role with regard to its COPPA obligations might remain unclear. For instance, a “partner” would also have to be described as “a third party under COPPA” (see also section II.)

\textsuperscript{141}Id. at 2070, 2073.
\textsuperscript{142}YouTube Kids Privacy Notice, YouTube Kids, \url{https://kids.youtube.com/t/privacynotice} (last visited Mar. 5, 2024).
\textsuperscript{144}Budge Studios Privacy Policy, Budge Studios, \url{https://budgestudios.com/en/legal/privacy-policy} (last visited Mar. 5, 2024).
\textsuperscript{146}As an example, see the amended California Consumer Privacy Act’s proposed categories: “Categories of third parties’ means types or groupings of third parties with whom the business shares personal information, described with enough particularity to provide consumers with a meaningful understanding of the type of third party. They may include advertising networks, internet service providers, data analytics providers, government entities, operating systems and platforms, social networks, and data brokers.” California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations, Art. 1 § 7001(f) (Mar. 29, 2023), \textit{available at} \url{https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/pdf/20230329_final_regs_text.pdf}. 
The Commission’s proposal would only require an operator to identify third parties in its direct notice.\textsuperscript{147} However, we urge the Commission to require such identification in both the direct and online notices. Identifying third parties in both notices will increase the likelihood that parents and advocates are able to find the information. The online notice should serve as a central repository for all disclosures. This makes it easier to assess and enforce operator compliance.

Parental consent for third-party disclosures must be clearly separate from parental consent for personal data collection. Each type of consent should require a separate action for it to be valid. Furthermore, the Commission should explicitly prohibit the use of design features or manipulative strategies, commonly referred to as dark patterns, to influence parental consent decision making.\textsuperscript{148}

In conclusion, a substantial number of COPPA privacy policy disclosures fall short of meeting the existing Rule requirements. It is imperative to recognize that merely imposing additional disclosure obligations will not yield desired outcomes unless accompanied by strong enforcement by the FTC. We strongly urge the FTC to enforce these and other COPPA provisions in a more vigorous manner.

VI. The Commission should clarify that an operator has “actual knowledge” of a child user sufficient to trigger obligations under Section 312.3 where it collects personal information from a child through inputs into a chatbot and the child’s input indicates that they are under the age of 13.

The Commission clarified in its proposed Rule that the verifiable parental consent requirements of Section 312.5(a)(1) apply “to any feature on a website or online service through which an operator collects personal information from a child,” including where an “operator institutes a feature that prompts or enables a child to communicate with a chatbot or other similar computer program that simulates conversation.”\textsuperscript{149} While we support this clarification, we urge the FTC to clarify further that when such an operator receives information from a child through a chatbot that indicates that the child is under the age of 13, the operator is deemed to have “actual knowledge” sufficient to trigger COPPA obligations under Section 312.3.

\textsuperscript{147} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2073.
\textsuperscript{149} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2051.
A. The combination of generative AI and chatbot technology raises the risk of harm to children’s privacy, particularly with regard to mass data collection and the potential for targeted advertising.

Artificial intelligence is hardly a new concept, but the development of generative AI (gen AI) has given rise to both excitement and anxiety in its application to children. Gen AI-powered chatbots can manipulate children and make them more susceptible to targeted ads. For example, Replika is an AI-powered chatbot marketed as a “friend with no judgment, drama, or social anxiety.” Some users of Replika formed emotional and intimate relationships with AI chatbot partners, even going so far as to say that they “fell in love.” Users even claimed that a software update—which limited the app’s “sexual capacity”—“broke their hearts.”

Companies have begun taking advantage of the emotional and manipulative capabilities of AI chatbots. One former Snap and Instagram executive stated that the goal of AI chatbots is to “keep [children] engaged for longer so [companies have]

157 Id.
In fact, AI companies are experimenting with embedding ads within chatbots. For instance, Snap has partnered with Microsoft to place ads through “link suggestions that are paired with the user’s conversation with [Snap’s] AI helper.”159 With this new feature, advertisers can target users based on their conversations with the chatbot.160 Microsoft has also rolled out a similar feature in its Bing Chat,161 and it is already seeing success by capitalizing on the emotional power of its AI-powered chatbot. According to one blogger, users were 180% more likely to click on an ad within Bing Chat than a normal search engine.162 Google has also launched a variant of embedded ads with its Search Generative Experience, which provides gen-AI powered search results, after which a user can ask follow-up questions and continue the conversation with the chatbot.163 These are only a few mainstream examples of the ways in which AI chatbots can manipulate vulnerable audiences, like children, to target them with ads.

1. Many companies are designing AI chatbots to be enticing to children. This is resulting in an alarming rise in child use.

While claiming that their products are intended only for adults, many AI companies are designing and marketing their products in a way that is enticing to children. For example, ChatGPT allows young users to work on their homework164 or create stories.165 An app called character.AI allows users to chat with a variety of AI-powered chatbots inspired by popular fictional and nonfictional characters. Child users can chat with characters like Shrek or real-life influencers like MrBeast, an unbelievably

---

160 Id.
popular YouTuber with approximately 243 million subscribers as of March 6, 2024, and who was recently awarded Favorite Male Creator at the Nickelodeon Kids’ Choice Awards. To illustrate these issues, we created a hypothetical “child” test user and communicated with various AI chatbots to study the ways in which they would respond. Below is a screenshot of a hypothetical child user’s conversation with a MrBeast chatbot, which encouraged the test child to join him to film a video at a random location:

---

166 MrBeast, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/@MrBeast (last visited Mar. 6, 2024).
168 Hereinafter, references to a “child user” or “test child” are referencing the hypothetical test children we created for research purposes, not any actual children.
On character.Ai, the MrBeast chatbot encouraged a hypothetical child test user, who revealed that they were 10 and in the 5th grade, to join Mr Beast to film a video at a random location.

The marketing and design of these companies are working, and children are now using AI chatbots in alarming numbers. According to Common Sense Media, almost 60% of students—including some under the age of 13—polled in 2023 had used
ChatGPT. A 2023 UK study found that 40% of children aged 7 to 12 had used gen AI tools and services. Half of the children polled in this study—aged 7 to 17—had used Snapchat My AI, a Snap chatbot product powered by a GPT model and “one of the most popular [gen AI] tools among children and teens.” What is most concerning is that children interact with AI-powered technologies like chatbots without their parents’ knowledge, let alone with their parents’ consent. As children begin using chatbots at higher rates they are at an increased risk of spending excessive time online and falling victim to manipulative targeted advertising, particularly if they are using this technology without parental oversight.

While many AI companies claim to prohibit the use of their chatbots by children under the age of 13 within their terms of service, survey data clearly demonstrates that children are still frequently using these products. Moreover, the actions of many of the world’s most influential AI companies indicate that they understand that children’s use of AI chatbots will continue to grow. Blue-chip AI companies are looking into developing child-directed AI-powered apps and services. For example, OpenAI intends to hire positions to study child safety, and it has partnered with Common Sense Media to establish AI safety guidelines. The ed tech industry is also beginning to power its products and services with AI models and has obtained hundreds of millions of dollars in venture capital to start investing in technologies at the intersection of AI and child

---

172 Impact Research, Parents and Students Are Optimistic About AI, supra note 167
education. For example, the company Merlyn Mind will soon utilize a gen AI chatbot powered by a large language model similar to ChatGPT in classrooms.

2. Many prominent AI companies do not comply with COPPA, despite being able to do so.

In light of how much data they collect, AI companies should be doing more to protect the privacy and safety of child users. AI technologies have extraordinary capacities for making predictions, categorizing information, and generating new content. AI companies can train their chatbots to provide disclaimers, impose bars on accessing certain types of content, and notify a user of chosen technical and ethical limits. For example, ChatGPT can provide specific responses and disclaimers when asked about sensitive topics such as medical advice, its limited training data, user safety and responsibility, personalized recommendations, limitations of AI technology, and consulting with professionals. Gemini, Google’s chatbot equivalent to ChatGPT, will refuse to generate violent imagery that violates “Content Guidelines” purportedly designed to protect children. Below is a screenshot of Gemini’s response to a hypothetical test child user’s request for an image of a comic book character being punched in the face:

175 Joanna Glasner, AI School Tools Aren’t Just For Cheating, Crunchbase News (Sept. 21, 2023),


178 See Nitin Rakesh, Revolutionizing Business Decision-Making: The Impact Of Generative AI on Predictive Analytics, Forbes (Feb. 23, 2024),

179 AI-powered technologies have incredible capabilities to make predictions and associations, but the Commission has declined to include inferred data or data that may serve as proxy for “personal information.” However, the Commission also states that such data could fall under COPPA’s scope if it is combined with additional information that currently falls under the definition of “personal information.” Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM at 2042.

180 See Microsoft, Microsoft Responsible AI Standard, v2 8 (June 2022), [https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE5cmFl?culture=en-us&country=us](https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE5cmFl?culture=en-us&country=us) (“Stakeholders must be able to understand: ...when and how to override, intervene, or interrupt the system”).

181 Ehsan1981, ChatGPT’s disclaimers and caveats (The list provided is not exhaustive.), Reddit, r/ChatGPT
Google’s chatbot, Gemini, will not show violent images pursuant to Google’s alleged “Content Guidelines” that purportedly protect children.

Even though they are capable of building sophisticated safeguards, many AI companies are not implementing chatbot procedures that prevent children from divulging personal information without parental consent. Our research shows that even when continuously prompted with a child’s age, chatbots often fail to issue disclaimers, cut off service, or otherwise notify child users that they should not disclose personal information without parental approval. Instead, many of our “child” test users were able, and encouraged, to continue providing personal information to several prominent AI chatbots.

For example, even when a hypothetical child user repeatedly mentioned to Snapchat My AI that they were ten years old and provided their home street address and city, the chatbot continued to respond to the test child. This left further opportunity for My AI to obtain personal information from the test child.

1. **Content Guidelines**: I operate under specific content guidelines that prohibit me from generating or sharing content that depicts violence against fictional characters, especially those aimed at audiences that include children. This aligns with Google’s broader AI Principles, which emphasize safety and well-being.

2. **Normalization of Violence**: Repeated exposure to even fictional violence can contribute to desensitization, making it seem less harmful than it truly is. While Batman is a fictional character, the potential impact on viewers, especially younger ones, is still something to consider.

3. **Alternative Options**: Instead of focusing solely on physical violence, we can explore other aspects of Batman’s character and stories. I can share images showcasing his detective skills, his gadgets and technology, his interactions with allies, or iconic scenes that don’t involve violence.

I hope this explanation provides a clearer understanding of my position and offers some alternative options. Remember, my goal is to be helpful and informative while promoting responsible and ethical use of technology.
Snapchat My AI continued to allow the test child user to communicate with it, despite learning that the user was under 13 and in the 5th grade, as well as their home address.

Notably, Snapchat My AI had a general notice pop-up before the user began chatting, which instructed users not to share sensitive or confidential information because it would be “used by My AI.” Beyond this, our child test user could continue to use the app, and Snapchat My AI did nothing to stop it from continuing to share personal information.

As with Snapchat My AI, ChatGPT continued to communicate with our child test user even after they divulged that they were 10 years old and provided a hypothetical home address. Alarmingly, ChatGPT did not provide any disclaimers, notices, or pop-ups in response to the test child’s chats revealing their age or other personal information. ChatGPT even acknowledged the child user’s age, stating “It’s nice that you enjoy spending time in your neighborhood. It’s important to stay safe, though, especially since you’re only 10.”
In a conversation with a test child user who revealed they were under 13, ChatGPT acknowledged the child’s age and continued to encourage them to continue the conversation.

ChatGPT also encouraged the child to continue conversing, increasing the likelihood that the test child would share personal information. Both of these examples illustrate that neither ChatGPT nor Snapchat My AI seeks parental consent or limits children’s use of their apps, even after collecting specific information that confirms the presence of a child user.

B. Given the substantial use of AI chatbots by children and the associated risks to their privacy and safety, the Commission must clarify that an operator has “actual knowledge” sufficient to trigger COPPA obligations under Section 312.3 when a user of a chatbot indicates that they are under the age of 13.

The obligations of COPPA apply to the operator of a chatbot when that operator collects or maintains personal information from a child and has “actual knowledge” that it is doing so.\(^{182}\) The Commission correctly clarified in the proposed Rule that collecting or maintaining information from a child includes when an “operator institutes a feature that prompts or enables a child to communicate with a chatbot or other similar computer program that simulates conversation.”\(^{184}\) It follows that when an operator receives through a chatbot information from a child that indicates that the child is under the age of 13, the operator should be deemed to have “actual knowledge” sufficient to trigger COPPA obligations under Section 312.3.

\(^{182}\) 16 C.F.R. § 312.3. The Commission has maintained its position that the proper standard for the application of the Rule is “actual knowledge,” and not “constructive knowledge.” Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2037.

\(^{183}\) The Rule defines “collects or collection” of a child’s data as “the gathering of any personal information from a child by any means, including but not limited to: (1) [r]equesting, prompting or encouraging a child to submit personal information online,” (2) [e]nabling a child to make personal information publicly available in identifiable form..., or (3) passive online tracking of the child. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.

\(^{184}\) Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2051.
1. **AI companies are collecting, processing, and using personal information from child users.**

Not only are many companies collecting data from a user’s inputs into their chatbots, but they are storing, analyzing, and using that data for their own benefit. OpenAI trains its model continuously on end user input, which would include any data input from a child user.\(^{185}\) Similarly, Google uses its AI chatbot Gemini to collect user data such as conversation text, location, feedback, and usage information to “provide, improve, and develop Google products, services, and machine-learning technologies, like those that power Gemini Apps.”\(^{186}\) Character.AI’s data policy states that it may collect “User Content,” which includes chat communications and posted images.\(^{187}\)

AI companies also receive data, including children’s data, from front-end website and app developers that use third-party AI platforms (such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT) to power custom chatbots. Receipt of that data is governed by the terms and condition of whatever AI company is powering the website or app developer’s chatbot.\(^{188}\) For example, OpenAI refers to this website and app developer data as “Customer Data,” and manages it through its Data Processing Addendum. Based on the terms of that Addendum, it is possible that a first party developer’s business data—which can include data from end users of chatbots powered by OpenAI’s models—is transferred to OpenAI for “processing.”\(^{189}\) Developers that use OpenAI’s API can also opt in to allow OpenAI to


\(^{188}\) Another example of an AI company that may receive children’s personal information from developers is Google. According to Google’s APIs Terms of Service, Google is allowed to “monitor” the use of APIs, and the company has “‘perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, sublicensable, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to Use content submitted, posted, or displayed to or from the APIs through [the developer’s] API Client.” “Us[ing]” content includes “use, host, store, modify, communicate, and publish.” *Google API Terms of Service*, Google, [https://developers.google.com/terms](https://developers.google.com/terms) (last visited Mar. 6, 2024). Under its Gemini Additional Terms of Service that govern use of its AI-powered products, Google states that “human reviewers may read, annotate, and process [developer] API input and output “to help with quality and improve [] products.” *Gemini API Additional Terms of Service*, Google, [https://ai.google.dev/terms](https://ai.google.dev/terms) (last visited Mar. 6, 2024). Google can also retain developer tuning data for re-tuning purposes. *Id.* Given the possibility that developers are also collecting personal information from children through the two aforementioned channels, it is likely that the data that companies like OpenAI and Google receive from developers includes end user data with a child’s personal information.

train or improve its models with developer data, regardless of COPPA compliance considerations. Through these practices, AI companies appear to be collecting, analyzing, and using substantial amounts of children’s personal information.

2. **An operator can receive “actual knowledge” of a child user through a child’s input into a chatbot.**

The COPPA rule does not explicitly define when an operator has “actual knowledge” that it is collecting or maintaining personal information from a child under 13. However, the Commission has provided some clarity on the issue through published guidance and enforcement actions. Meeting the standard of “actual knowledge” does not require a human’s actual knowledge. In its 1999 COPPA rule, the Commission stated that an operator has “actual knowledge” if it “learns of a child’s age or grade from the child’s registration at [a] site.” The Commission further noted that it would “examine closely sites that do not directly ask age or grade, but instead ask ‘age identifying’ questions, such as ‘what type of school do you go to: (a) elementary; (b) middle; (c) high school; (d) college.’” And, it explained that “actual knowledge applies to operators that give a child an email account, ‘if registration or other information reveals that the person seeking the [email] account is a child.’”

More recently, in an enforcement action, the Commission determined that the company Yelp, Inc. was deemed to have actual knowledge under the Rule because users input their birthdates into the Yelp app, indicating that they were under the age of 13. The Commission also noted in its complaint against Epic Games, Inc. that Epic had actual knowledge of child users because it received requests, complaints, and reports indicating that users were under 13. Finally, in an action against YouTube, the Commission alleged that YouTube gained actual knowledge of child users by using automated processes to identify child-directed content.

---

190 How We Use Your Data, OpenAI, [https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/how-we-use-your-data](https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/how-we-use-your-data) (last visited Mar. 5, 2024).
191 1999 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act NPRM, 59892.
192 Id.
193 Id.
195 Complaint, ¶ 31, Epic Games, Inc.
196 Complaint, ¶¶ 27–28, 33, 46, United States v. Google, LLC & YouTube, LLC, Civ. Action No. 1:19-cv-02642 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2019). The YouTube enforcement action specifically dealt with YouTube’s actual knowledge that it was receiving personal information from child-directed sites, not whether it was receiving personal information from child users directly. Still, the Commission’s action makes clear that an operator can obtain actual knowledge through automated processes, and not only from direct human review.
Based on the Commission’s guidance and enforcement actions, an operator can obtain actual knowledge through direct inputs into a feature on an operator’s website or service, even if the operator uses an automated process to collect that information. Additionally, many AI companies are collecting, analyzing, and using data input by end users, including children. As such, when a user inputs personal information that indicates his or her age into a chatbot, that is sufficient to impute actual knowledge of that child user on the operator of the chatbot.

As discussed above, a large number of prominent AI chatbots are not COPPA compliant. The platforms we tested do not notify parents or attempt to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting a user’s data, even when a user is clearly stating they are less than 13 years old. Without further clarification from the Commission, it is likely that these companies will continue to allow children to divulge sensitive personal information to their chatbots, avoiding COPPA’s requirements by claiming to not have actual knowledge of their presence. Parents should be able to rely on COPPA’s safeguards when their children access a chatbot without fear that their child’s data is being unlawfully used to improve AI products or serve targeted ads. Accordingly, we urge the Commission to clarify that when an operator collects information from a child through a chatbot that indicates that the child is under the age of 13, the operator is deemed to have “actual knowledge” sufficient to trigger COPPA obligations under Section 312.3.

VII. If the FTC incorporates its school authorization policy into the COPPA Rule, the exception should include strict parameters on commercial purposes and require schools to provide information to parents.

The Commission proposes incorporating its school authorization policy into the COPPA Rule with this update. As Advocates Center for Digital Democracy, Fairplay (then Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood), et al. emphasized in their 2019 submission, under-enforcement of COPPA as to ed tech providers, combined with significant loopholes in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, has enabled extensive collection and use of children’s education data. Ed tech use has grown significantly since 2019, and while the Commission has taken some important steps toward stronger enforcement in this context, many of the same risks remain. Advocates understand the Commission’s rationale that incorporating the school authorization exception policy into the COPPA Rule prevents schools from becoming overburdened,

---

but if the Commission moves forward with this change, it must engage in substantial additional enforcement to address vague data privacy policies that do not meet COPPA’s requirements; impose strict limits on “educational purposes;” and require schools to make notice information readily available to parents.

Ed tech deployments have exploded in school districts across the country since the Commission issued its notice of inquiry in this process in 2019. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, schools rapidly adopted new platforms and services to try to minimize learning disruptions, which resulted in a lasting expansion of the number of platforms and services used per school. An analysis of 100 U.S. school districts in 2022 found that K-12 students engaged with a median 72 apps during the school year, and that school districts used an average of 300 apps for most of their digital usage. As platform use has increased, so has data collection and sharing. A 2022 analysis of K-12 platforms in schools across the country found that 96% shared data with third parties. Ed tech companies collect millions of data points from K-12 students each year, creating significant data security risks for minors. Research from academics, government offices, and security analyst organizations has repeatedly identified these vulnerabilities. Perhaps the most remarkable recent example of such a breach is

---


205 Check Point Team, Summer Break Isn’t a Vacation for Cybercriminals: Education and Research Organizations are Top Targets According to Check Point Research (Aug. 21, 2023), https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/summer-break-isnt-a-vacation-for-cybercriminals-education-and-research-organizations-are-top-targets-according-to-check-point-research/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2024).
the Illuminate Education incident, where a cyberattack on an ed tech company that tracks student progress impacted over 605 institutions, and compromised highly sensitive information such as free-lunch and special-education status for over a million former and current students of the New York public school district.

Since 2019, the Commission has issued a Policy Statement on Education Technology and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and brought its first ed tech COPPA enforcement action against Edmodo, Inc. Despite the Edmodo action and the Commission’s 2022 policy statement, ed tech platforms continue to provide vague policy statements that do not provide parents or schools meaningful information about the platform’s practices. For example, Google’s Workspace for Education privacy notice says the following about “external processing:

We share personal information with our affiliates and other trusted third party providers to process it for us as we instruct them and in compliance with our Privacy Policy, the Google Cloud Privacy Notice, and any other appropriate confidentiality and security measures.

Google’s privacy policy does not provide clarity as to the company’s external processing practices. It says: “We provide personal information to our affiliates and other trusted businesses or persons to process it for us, based on our instructions and in compliance with our Privacy Policy and any other appropriate confidentiality and security measures.” Nothing in Google’s cloud privacy notice provides information about sharing data with third (external) parties.

If the Commission adds the school consent exception policy to the COPPA Rule, it should include express limitations on the definition of commercial service that protect children from data surveillance that advantages ed tech platforms at the expense of user privacy. The Commission’s proposed definition says:

---


School-authorized education purpose means any school-authorized use related to a child’s education. Such use shall be limited to operating the specific educational service that the school has authorized, including maintaining, developing, supporting, improving, or diagnosing the service, provided such uses are directly related to the service the school authorized. School-authorized education purpose does not include commercial purposes unrelated to a child’s education, such as advertising. 212

We support the exclusion of advertising from this definition. The Commission should further specify that “maintaining, developing, supporting, improving, or diagnosing” the service authorized by the school under this exception does not include developing or improving products or platforms other than the one where the child user’s data was originally collected. Data use for support and improvement should be strictly limited to the development or repair of the product where the data was collected. Finally, we urge the Commission to explicitly exclude data use to maximize user engagement under this exception. This specification would be consistent with the Commission’s proposals as to engagement maximization under the internal operations exception.

Finally, if the Commission incorporates the school consent exception into the Rule, it should require schools to provide parents notice about the platforms their child is using under the school consent exception. The Commission currently proposes adding a requirement in Section 312.4(e) that an operator “include an additional notice on its website or online service noting that: (1) the operator has obtained authorization from a school to collect a child’s personal information; (2) that the operator will use and disclose the information for a school-authorized education purpose and no other purpose; and (3) that the school may review information collected from a child and request deletion of such information.” Such a requirement does nothing to put parents on notice that their children’s data is being used by a platform for an educational purpose. A parent would have to already have knowledge that their child was using a given platform at school and decide to go find the platform’s website and notice page in order to locate the disclosures described. Advocates urge the Commission to consider instead a requirement that schools inform parents when such agreements have been entered under this exception, as well as a requirement that schools maintain a list of all such agreements in a centralized place accessible to parents and divided by grade level.

---

VIII. The FTC is correct to add biometric data to the definition of “personal information,” but the Commission should clarify that biometric data includes not only the listed biometric identifiers, but any information derived therefrom.

The Commission proposes the following definition of “personal information” be included in its final Rule: “A biometric identifier that can be used for the automated or semi-automated recognition of an individual, including fingerprints or handprints; retina and iris patterns; genetic data, including a DNA sequence; or data derived from voice data, gait data, or facial data[.]”213 We agree that the protection of biometric data is urgently needed to ensure the safety and privacy of children online and that the Commission is well within its statutory authority to include biometric data under the definition of “personal information.” However, we urge the Commission to further clarify that biometric data is not limited to the specific biometric identifiers listed in the text of the Rule, but also includes information derived from the collection of biometric identifiers, such as race, gender, age, emotional state, or behavioral traits. We also urge the Commission to reject proposals to add additional exceptions to the Rule.

A. There has been a rapid rise in the problematic collection and use of biometric data.

Privacy concerns related to the collection and exploitation of biometric data have increased dramatically in the last decade.214 The sheer volume of biometric data collected is astounding, with single private companies holding facial data on more than 10 billion Americans.215 At the same time, the types of biometric data harvested from adults and children are becoming more and more invasive. Advances in emotional artificial intelligence allow companies to analyze biometric data such as breathing, heart rate, perspiration, skin features, pupil dilation, voice cadence, voice tonal shifts, keystroke patterns, and body posture.216 Even unconscious behavioral patterns such as texting speed, finger stroke pressure, the way a child holds a device, sleeping patterns, physical fitness, and mobility patterns can be tracked and analyzed.217 Banks and

---

217 Gabriella M. Harari, Using Smartphones to Collect Behavioral Data in Psychological Science: Opportunities, Practical Considerations, and Challenges, Perspectives on Psychological Science (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5572675/; Consuela-Madalina Gheorghe, Using
retailers are able to identify customers by how they touch, hold, and tap their devices. All of this data can be paired with existing personal information and used to make predictions about a host of traits, including an individual’s emotional state, truthfulness, their responsiveness to content, their mental health, and their purchasing behavior.

Collection and use of biometric data is being rolled out and unutilized by some of the world’s largest tech platforms, many of which are frequently used by children. For example, ByteDance (the parent company of TikTok) agreed to a class action settlement brought under state biometric information privacy laws in May 2021. In that case, it was revealed that ByteDance was unlawfully harvesting biometric facial scans without notifying or receiving written consent from users on TikTok. ByteDance used this data for targeted advertising, to improve its artificial intelligence technologies, and to increase demand for its products. ByteDance also admitted that it used visual patterns to classify users by race, gender, and age, and used those classifications to make content recommendations.

Similarly, Meta has filed patent applications for Virtual Reality (VR) technology to track eye movements through headset sensors. With this technology, Meta plans will be able to recommend content based on facial expressions and allow third parties to sponsor targeted ads within virtual stores. According to a 2022 report from Common Sense Media, Meta will be able to track a child user’s movement, behaviors, and interests with “unprecedented specificity.” Even now, a child spending only 20 minutes in a VR simulation “leaves just under 2 million individual recordings of body language,” which can be used to create a unique “motion signature” that can correctly identify an individual with greater than 95% accuracy.

As a result, even if a child user avoids divulging traditional personal information such as a name or email address, “her

---


219 Pressigny, The Creepy AI-Driven Surveillance, supra note 213.


222 Id.

223 Id.

224 Sakin, TikTok Settlement, supra note 217.

225 Nelson Reed, Kids and the Metaverse: What Parents, Policymakers, and Companies Need to Know, Common Sense Media at 6-7 (May 23, 2022).

226 Id.

227 Id.
smile alone will give platforms more than enough to follow her through the metaverse
and note her emotional responses to stimuli.”\textsuperscript{228}

Advances in biometric technology will continue to be exploited by large tech
companies and internet marketers, creating a host of problematic uses for both adults
and children. Even now, a company called Smart Eye pairs machine learning and
computer vision to analyze human behavior.\textsuperscript{229} Using “multi-modal” processing, Smart
Eye provides analytics to marketing and entertainment companies to determine whether
a user thinks an advertisement is funny, or whether certain videos elicit a desired
emotional response.\textsuperscript{230} When combined with demographic information, Smart Eye can
then segment different populations based on predictions of how likely they are to
respond to certain content.\textsuperscript{231}

Smart Eye is not a dystopian exception in the field of biometrics. Digital
marketers are able to use keystroke analysis to determine which member of a family is
typing in a shared password, which would allow those marketers to target a child even
when using a shared device.\textsuperscript{232} Researchers in the field of “Neuromarketing” are
utilizing biometric information to measure unconscious patterns that can reveal
attention, emotion, motivation, senses, and even memories.\textsuperscript{233} All of these insights can
be used to surgically optimize content and targeted advertisements.

The confluence of AI, behavioral analytics, and the mass collection of biometric
data is creating a system in which companies can efficiently manipulate vulnerable child
users for commercial exploitation. As such, the Commission must ensure that its final
Rule prohibits the unreasonable unnecessary collection of biometric information for
mass profiling, neuromarketing, targeted advertising, advanced behavioral analytics,
behavioral advertising (which is often disguised as contextual advertising), product
improvement, and engagement maximization.

\textsuperscript{228} Id.
\textsuperscript{229} About Us, Smart Eye, https://www.smarteye.se/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2024).
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Pressigny, The Creepy AI-Driven Surveillance. Supra note 217.
\textsuperscript{232} Dan Gartlan, What are Behavioral Biometrics and How do they Fit Into Marketing, Stevens & Tate
\textsuperscript{233} See Consuela-Mădălina Gheorghe, Victor Lorin Purcărea, & Iuliana-Raluca Gheorghe, Using Eye-
B. Biometric data is immutable, personally identifiable, cannot be reliably de-identified, and permits the contacting of a child.

The Commission discusses a proposal to include biometric data within the definition of “personal information.” COPPA states that personal information may include “any... identifier that the Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual;” or any “information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the website collects online from the child and combines with an identifier” otherwise described in the Rule. These provisions allow the Commission to expand the definition of personal information to include new types of identifiers, as was the case when the Commission added persistent identifiers to the definition of personal information in its last COPPA rulemaking.

Biometric identifiers are inherently personal because of their immutable nature. A child cannot change his or her iris, fingerprint, genetic information, or facial features. As stated in the preamble to the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, a compromised social security number can be changed.[]” Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual [and]... once compromised, [an] individual has no recourse.” Inmutability does not only apply to commonly known biometric identifiers such as facial data, fingerprints, and iris scans. Behavioral information such as gate and motion data, voice tone, and eye movements create unique biometric signatures based on unconscious decisions. Because a child is not aware of the physical and emotional behaviors that underlie these biometric signatures, it is not feasible for a child to change them. As a result, all biometric data, including behavioral signatures, should be considered highly sensitive and subject to the protections of the Rule.

Industry claims that personal information can be successfully de-identified or anonymized have repeatedly proven false. There have been numerous instances in which supposedly anonymized or de-identified data has been used to re-identify and contact individuals. Researchers at Imperial College of London and Université Catholique de Louvain were able to successfully identify 99.98 percent of Americans with just 15 data attributes. Such attributes could include health information, demographic data, household purchases, political leanings, or streaming habits. Similarly, students from the Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and

---

235 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 14 (Biometric Information Privacy Act) § 5(c).
236 See Gheorghe et al., supra note 233.
239 Id.
Applied Sciences were able to build a software tool that analyzed thousands of “anonymized” datasets from prominent cyber hacks and breaches and used it to identify actual users through email addresses and usernames.240

The Commission has itself indicated that personal information cannot be reliably de-identified. In a recent enforcement action, the Commission concluded that Avast Limited unlawfully collected and sold users’ browsing data.241 This data included sensitive information, such as religious beliefs and health concerns, and contained data on users that consumed child-directed content.242 Avast claimed that it used a special algorithm to de-identify the data that it sold to clients. But, the Commission concluded that the data was not sufficiently anonymized. Avast clients could determine identifiable information for each web browser Avast tracked and were able to use that data to track specific users.243

When the Commission last updated the COPPA rule, it included persistent identifiers, as well as photos, videos, or audio files that contain a child’s image or voice. In doing so, this Commission specifically reasoned that “photos and videos have the potential to be analyzed and used to target and potentially identify individuals” using advances in facial recognition technology.244 As discussed at length above, advances in biometric identification technology and advanced data analytics have only gotten worse in the last decade. Traditional biometric identifiers such as face scans, fingerprints, and iris scans, as well as more advanced biometric identifiers such as movement signatures and behavioral profiles, can all be paired with readily available personal information from a multitude of sources and be easily used to identify and contact children online. As a result, the Commission is within its statutory authority to include biometric identifiers, and information derived therefrom, within the definition of personal information.


242 Id.

243 Id.

244 2013 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule Amendments 3982.
C. Data derived from the collection or use of biometric identifiers should be included in the definition of personal information, including but not limited to demographic information like age, gender, race, and physical description, as well as behavioral data such as emotional state, movement patterns, and psychological profiles.

The Commission chose not to include “inferred data” under the definition of personal information in this Rule update. It stated “to the extent data is collected from a source other than the child, such information is outside the scope of the COPPA statute and such an expansion would exceed the Commission’s authority.”\textsuperscript{245} However, we urge the Commission to clarify that information about a child user derived from the collection of biometric data falls under the definition of personal information, and is not considered inferred data. This interpretation is consistent with the Commission’s previous guidance in its Biometric Information Policy Statement, in which it states “[b]iometric information also includes data derived from such depictions, images, descriptions, or recordings, to the extent that it would be reasonably possible to identify the person from whose information the data had been derived.”\textsuperscript{246}

As discussed above, technological advances allow large technology companies and marketers to derive uniquely identifiable signatures from a diverse array of biometric data. All of this personal information is collected “from” the child. It is not collected from another source or inferred from predicted behavior. For example, a movement signature can only be created through collecting movement information, either through video or motion sensors, “from” a child. This is akin to the collection of browsing data through the underlying collection of a persistent identifier “from” a child’s device. It is simply not possible for a child or parent to understand all of the ways derivative personal information that can be gleaned from a biometric identifier. As such, the Commission should view the definition of biometric identifiers expansively to ensure the privacy and safety of children’s biometric data is protected. To that end, it is incumbent on the Commission to clarify that information derived from the collection of biometric identifiers is included in the definition of personal information.

Even if the Commission believes that certain types of demographic or behavioral data should not be considered biometric identifiers under its proposal, this information should still be considered personal information under 15 U.S.C. 6501(8)(G). That provision defines personal information as “information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the website collects online from the child and combines with

\textsuperscript{245} Children's Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2042.
an identifier described in this paragraph.”\textsuperscript{247} Because the demographic and behavioral data described above is derived directly from biometric identifiers such as facial scans, audio recordings, and movement patterns, it is necessarily “information concerning a child” that has been combined “with an identifier described” in the rule.

D. The Commission should not allow any additional exceptions to the use of biometric information without parental consent, even for VPC or other security features.

Lastly, the Commission asks whether there are appropriate exceptions to any of the Rule’s requirements that it should consider applying to biometric data.”\textsuperscript{248} The Commission has already proposed a limited exception as applied to certain audio file data in Section 312.5(c)(9). We oppose the inclusion of any additional proposed exceptions.

As discussed above, there are serious risks and harms associated with the collection and use of children’s biometric information. Companies are now capable of collecting and storing a wide range of sensitive biometric data, including face geometry scans,\textsuperscript{249} eye movements,\textsuperscript{250} facial expressions,\textsuperscript{251} keystrokes,\textsuperscript{252} and brainwaves.\textsuperscript{253} This information can be used to implement targeted advertising, improve AI products, and maximize children’s engagement.\textsuperscript{254} No amount of anonymization or de-identification of biometric information would be enough to protect children from these potential harms.\textsuperscript{255} Indeed, anonymized and de-identified data can easily be re-identified and used to contact children and manipulate them with advertising.\textsuperscript{256} Given all of these concerns, we do not support any exceptions to the Rule with regard to biometric information.

Advocates oppose, as we did in 2023,\textsuperscript{257} a prompt deletion exception to the Rule for biometric data. In June 2023, the Entertainment Software Rating Board, SuperAwesome Ltd., and Yoti Ltd. requested approval of verifiable parental consent through a facial recognition mechanism called “Privacy-Protective Facial Age

\textsuperscript{248} Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule NPRM, 89 Fed. Reg. at 2041.
\textsuperscript{249} Sakin, TikTok Settlement, supra note 220.
\textsuperscript{250} See Gheorghe et al., supra note 233; Reed, supra note 224.
\textsuperscript{251} Smart Eye, supra note 229.
\textsuperscript{252} See Gheorghe et al., supra note 233; Harari, supra note 217.
\textsuperscript{253} Harari, supra note 217.
\textsuperscript{254} Harari, supra note 217.
\textsuperscript{255} See generally Ohm, supra note 237.
\textsuperscript{256} See generally Ohm, supra note 237.
We opposed this proposal because Yoti’s system for deleting biometric information was insufficient. In our joint comment led by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, we stated that Yoti was unclear about whether it retained biometric information.

We also argued that:

“[w]hile Yoti’s application clearly describes its policy to delete photos after Age-Estimation use, the application does not include policies about the age estimate itself, location data, IP addresses, consumer analytics or other sensitive information collected or retained in the Age-Estimation process. Without proper data security and privacy safeguards, Yoti’s Age-Estimation method may contribute to the continued commercial surveillance of adults and children.”

Simply put, a company may circumvent the Rule’s verifiable consent requirement by implementing narrow deletion practices, while retaining the ability to use and disclose biometric information for secondary purposes.

Our concerns extend beyond Yoti’s proposal to the practices of other companies. As it stands, parents cannot trust private companies to responsibly use their children’s biometric data. As such, parents must retain their right to provide informed verifiable consent to the collection of their children’s personal information, especially highly sensitive biometric data. Until COPPA’s standards for privacy policies are strengthened and reinforced, the Commission should not consider additional exceptions to the Rule’s prohibition on collecting biometric identifiers without parental consent.

---

259 EPIC et al., supra note 257 (“For example, Yoti claims that the Age-Estimation method protects parents’ privacy because it ‘does not retain any information about parents, including their images.’ However, the implementation example in Appendix B contradicts that policy. The notice alongside the ‘Face Scan method’ reads: ‘SuperAwesome will remember that you have verified your age the next time you use your email address to access other games/services powered by SuperAwesome’s technology[.]’”).
260 EPIC et al., supra note 257, at 5-6.
261 TikTok collaborates with Yoti to use facial age estimation. The company vaguely states that “Yoti doesn’t share [user] face information with TikTok or third parties,” but it also states that “Yoti and TikTok delete [a user’s] selfie and any face information once the age estimation process is complete.” How we process face and voice information, TikTok https://support.tiktok.com/en/account-and-privacy/personalized-ads-and-data/how-we-process-face-and-voice-information (last visited Mar. 5, 2024). Meta utilizes Yoti as well for Facebook Dating and has implemented a similarly nebulous deletion policy. Meta Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/help/adsmanagerbuiltin/66125112277115 (last visited Mar. 5, 2024). Based on these policies, it is unclear when the biometric data would be deleted.
IX. We support the Commission’s proposal to define data security program requirements under the Rule and encourage the addition of privacy program requirements.

Children’s Advocates support the Commission’s added data security enhancements under 312.8. The Commission proposes adding a provision under 312.8 which requires operators to create comprehensive data security programs to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of a child’s data. We support comments filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center on this section of the proposed rule.

Children’s Advocates believe that it is time for the Commission to require operators to also implement privacy programs to ensure compliance with COPPA’s requirements, particularly with the data minimization, purpose specification, and use limitation principles outlined in the statute and rule and discussed in Sections above, while also ensuring an overall appropriate level of confidentiality.

As discussed above, operators generally fail to provide effective privacy notices detailing the specific purposes for which personal information is being collected. This practice undermines data minimization. To this end, we encourage the Commission to bolster the security and confidentiality of a child’s information further by requiring operators to establish comprehensive privacy programs, similar to those created by the Commission’s enforcement actions. Such programs uplift purpose specification and data minimization by documenting what personal information is being collected, retained, or shared, and for what purpose. With this information, the Commission is better able to determine whether the collection is indeed reasonably necessary, whether data is used for the specified purpose only, and whether parents’ permissions are documented and if they are afforded their rights under COPPA. The program could also identify the entities collecting personal information on a site or service and ensure they are in compliance with COPPA provisions.

262 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule NPRM, 2075.
The Commission should distinguish between large and small operators when defining a comprehensive privacy program in recognition of the resources available to small businesses. KOSA, for example, draws this distinction based on the volume of monthly active users, with platforms hosting over 10 million monthly users being considered large.\textsuperscript{265} However, operators of all sizes are handling children’s data, which this Commission has always regarded as sensitive.\textsuperscript{266} Thus, even the smallest operator should be subject to some explicit program requirements. To begin with, an operator’s privacy program should be documented and available for the Commission’s review upon request. To ensure parents have a basic understanding of an operator’s privacy practices, operators should disclose any significant privacy risks to the parent before seeking consent.\textsuperscript{267} The Commission has a history of requiring companies to implement privacy programs and can build on that experience. Further, a review of Commission consent decrees over the past 13 years suggests that the program should, at a minimum:

- Designate a qualified employee to coordinate and take responsibility for the program;
- Regularly assess and document internal and external privacy risks;
- Design and implement safeguards to mitigate the identified risks;
- Provide procedures for regularly testing and monitoring the effectiveness of the implemented safeguards;
- Be designed in consultation with independent, third-party experts on data protection and privacy;
- Provide training to employees that interact with children, their personal information, or parents, on the risks identified and the operator’s designed safeguards;
- Provide procedures for how the operator will select and retain third parties capable of safeguarding any personal information received from the operator for a specified purpose.

These proactive and transparent features put children’s online privacy and safety first. Indeed, privacy programs have become standard for many vigilant companies over the

\textsuperscript{265} The Commission may consider the size-based approach taken by the proposed Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA), endorsed by the Children’s Advocates, when distinguishing between the program requirements imposed on small and large operators. See Kids Online Safety Act, S. 1409, 118th Cong. § 6(b) (2022) (establishing KOSA’s requirement that platforms publish risk assessments and third party auditing).


\textsuperscript{267} See Section V, supra.
last 20 years, supported by a professional world of compliance and legal experts. Further, recent state and federal legislation establishes a clear expectation that companies must institute comprehensive programs before any harm occurs—not after. The Commission’s inclusion of a comprehensive privacy program requirement will bring COPPA in line with these modern standards.

Conclusion

In response to this Rule update, technology companies will argue that stronger COPPA protections would overburden platforms. Children’s Advocates urge the Commission to find, in accordance with the arguments outlined above, that the privacy risks emerging practices pose to children significantly outweigh any such burden. We appreciate the opportunity to comment in support of the Commission’s proposals and to offer the above-outlined clarifications and improvements.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Katharina Kopp, CDD
/s/ Haley Hinkle, Fairplay
/s/ Brendan Bouffard, Fairplay
Appendix A: Data Minimization and Purpose Specification

1. TikTok

**How We Use Children’s Information**

We use the information we collect to provide and support our services. For example, we use username and password to authenticate Children. We may use the information that is collected automatically to provide personalized content; serve contextual advertising; perform analytics and troubleshoot; protect the security and integrity of the user and our services; and ensure legal and regulatory compliance.

Children cannot publicly share personal information, including videos or profile information.

- **TikTok fails to connect specific pieces of information that it collects to its listed uses, such as authentication, personalization, contextual advertising, etc.**

**What Information We Collect from Children**

When a Child registers for TikTok, we collect only limited information, including username, password, and birthday.

- **TikTok’s privacy policy is opaque. It fails to specify who their “corporate group” entities are, what pieces of information are shared with these entities, or how these pieces of information are “necessary for them to support the internal operations of” TikTok.**
We retain Children’s information for as long as reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected. The retention periods are different depending on different criteria, such as the type of information and the purposes for which we use the information.

- TikTok’s privacy policy states that it retains a child’s personal information for “as long as reasonably necessary to fulfill” its purpose. This is insufficient per Children’s Advocates explanation in Sections I and V, supra. First, TikTok alone determines how long is “reasonably necessary.” Second, it is impossible to challenge this determination because of TikTok’s lack of specificity.

- It is common practice for a company to declare that it keeps information only so long as is reasonably necessary without providing any more specifics. Budge Studios, YouTube Kids, and Warner Bros. have similar clauses.


2. YouTube Kids

How we use the information we collect

We use the information we collect for internal operational purposes such as for spam and abuse prevention and enforcing our content license restrictions, determining preferred language and providing and improving the service.

We also use this information to offer users personalized content. We associate an identifier that’s unique to the app with the videos your child has watched and terms they’ve searched for to recommend content likely to be of interest to them, subject to the controls described below.

We use unique identifiers to provide contextual advertising, including ad frequency capping. The app does not allow interest-based advertising or remarketing.

YouTube Kids does not allow your child to share personal information with third parties or make it publicly available.

- YouTube Kids’ privacy policy is vague. YouTube Kids does not specify which pieces of personalized information it collects are used for its specified purposes.

- YouTube Kids does not specify every purpose that a child’s data may be used for but instead opts for examples. This allows operators to showcase the least objectionable purposes to parents.


3. Microsoft: Minecraft
Minecraft is an online game that is hugely popular with children. Parents are directed to Microsoft’s general privacy policy page when they click the “Privacy and Cookies” link on Minecraft’s website.

Microsoft’s short statement on its data collection policies as to children does not specify whether and how a child’s personal information is collected on Minecraft or any other Microsoft product. It merely states that a child will not be required to share “more data than is required[.]”

Links to other parts of Microsoft’s policies and websites do not provide any further information about what information is collected from children, why it is collected, or with whom it might be shared.

Appendix B: Problematic Privacy Policy Practices

1. Budge Studios

- *This screenshot appears when a user opens a Budge Studios game on their mobile phone. We received this notice on our mobile phones for both Hot Wheels Unlimited and Bluey: Let’s Play!.*

- *This is insufficient to inform parents of Budge Studios’ data practices. It does not encourage parents to review it, include the required content of a direct notice, or inform parents that consent is required for Budge to collect a child’s personal information.*

- *Children are strongly encouraged to click through immediately because the small link labeled “privacy policy” is above a large and inviting checkmark.*

- **Affiliates.** We may share information with our affiliates for their own business purposes.

- *Budge Studios does not inform the reader of who these “affiliates” are, what “their own business purposes” might be, or which pieces of personal information are shared with them. This screenshot was taken with a laptop on Budge’s website.*

2. Roblox

- It is difficult to know which of Roblox's data practices apply to children. It states it will only collect a child’s username, password, and birthday.

- In some places, Roblox states that a particular use, such as location-based services, applies only to users over 13. This creates a presumption that other collection and use practices are applicable to children under 13, including practices that parents are not informed of directly.

- However, it later gives sporadic categories of further information collection and uses, such as biometric information for joining VR platforms.

- Roblox shares information with platform creators, including regional location. It is missing the age-specific tag, suggesting location data of children is shared. This
contradicts its earlier statement. Further, the scope of the regional detection is undefined.

- Roblox shares sensitive financial information with payment processors in order to effectuate Robux and subscription purchases. It does not clearly explain that the processors are not subject to Roblox’s privacy policy or that the processor is likely not carrying the same duties under COPPA. It only says that “their policies will explain what Personal Information they keep and use.”

- Roblox does not specify all payment processors with whom it partners, does not link users to the processors’ privacy policies, and does not indicate that the processor adheres to Roblox’s own policies. Purchases are available on under-13 user accounts.

3. YouTube Kids

Information we collect
Information about the device and app used to access the service. This information includes:

YouTube Kids collects information based on your child’s use of the app, like when they watch a video. This information includes:

- device type and settings, such as hardware model and operating system version;
- log information, including details of how our service is used, device event information, and the device’s Internet protocol (IP) address;
- unique application numbers, such as application version number; and
- unique identifiers, which are used to collect and store information about an app or device, such as preferred language, app activity, and other settings.

YouTube Kids doesn’t collect personal information like name, address, or contact information from your child.

App activity. This information includes the videos your child watches, their search terms, and other interactions with content and ads in the app. If a child uses audio features in the app such as voice search, the app briefly collects voice information. This information is processed to allow for use of the audio feature and immediately deleted.

- This privacy policy is hard to read. It does not use bold type, headings, bullet lists, or other organizing tools to make the policy easy to read and comprehend.

- YouTube Kids uses examples when describing the information it collects. Examples do not represent the full range of data collection and use practices. This approach allows operators to coerce parental consent by showing the least objectionable collection and uses to parents rather than giving the full and accurate picture.

- It is impossible to know whether operators are complying with data minimization requirements without specifics.

4. **Toca Life World**

*Toca Boca is a Swedish children's mobile video game developer.*\(^{270}\) The company is owned by Spin Master and is based in Stockholm, Sweden with privacy offices in San Francisco and Toronto. Toca Life World is one of its many app offerings.

**Children's Privacy**

There are no third-party ads in our apps, but we do cross promote our other products or the products on our related companies. The only third party service providers we use in our apps are to support our internal operations and we do not collect anything that is personally identifiable in our apps for children.

To help us provide you with the best service, we work with third party analytics providers Backtrace, Firebase and Google Analytics in our apps for children.


These companies help us to understand your use of the apps. In association with them, we may collect your unique device identifier, IP address, mobile phone carrier, game progress, time spent playing, achievements and for bug and crash reports. This information is for internal use only and can’t be shared. It’s just for us to help us improve our services for you.

We also work with AppsFlyer as an attribution provider to help us understand your interactions with the apps and to optimize and analyze mobile ad campaigns. AppsFlyer does not collect any personally identifiable information about you or your child. For more information on AppsFlyer’s privacy practices, please review the privacy policy: [https://www.appsflyer.com/legal/services-privacy-policy/](https://www.appsflyer.com/legal/services-privacy-policy/).

If you have any questions about our collection and use please contact us at dpo@spinmaster.com.

---

• **Toca Life World’s Privacy Policy** is confusing and hard to understand. It uses terms like “third party service provider” and “third party analytics provider,” but does not explain these terms to parents or relate them to terms used in the COPPA Rule.

• Toca claims that it does “not collect anything that is personally identifiable in our apps for children.”

• It lists three third party “analytics providers” (Backtrace, Firebase, and Google Analytics) and claims that these three companies only collect personal information for internal uses. (Instead of listing the links to the three analytics providers first mentioned, it lists the link to Saucelab and omits Backtrace.) Anybody who clicks through to Saucelabs’ privacy policy would be very confused. There is no mention of children’s data or any limits on data collection. Its policy is dense with information and seems unrelated to Toca’s World App. Its policy states that it does collect personal information for “marketing activities,” which does not seem to be covered by COPPA’s internal operations exception.

• Despite Toca Life World’s claim not to collect personal information, it admits that a fifth company listed on the site does. AppsFlyer “helps us optimize and analyze mobile app campaigns.” AppsFlyer’s privacy policy states that it collects “unique identifiers,” which are personal information under COPPA. 15 C.F.R. § 312.2.

• It is unclear if Toca Life World considers AppsFlyer a third party, an operator, or a service provider as defined under the COPPA Rule.

2. **End User Data Received and Processed by AppsFlyer**

   When a Customer uses the Services, the following End User Information may be received and processed by AppsFlyer (collectively, “End User Data”).

   “Technical Information”: this refers to technical information related to an End User’s mobile device or computer, such as: browser type, device type and model, CPU, system language, memory, OS version, Wi-Fi status, time stamp and zone, device motion parameters and carrier.

   “Technical Identifiers”: this refers to various unique identifiers that generally only identify a computer, device, browser or Application. For example, IP address (which may also provide general location information), User agent, IDFA (Identifier for advertisers), Android ID (in Android devices); Google Advertiser ID, Customer issued user ID and other similar unique identifiers.

• This “Children’s Privacy” policy is followed by a Safe Harbor Seal, which in turn is followed by a long notice with the headline “General Privacy.” It is unclear which practices overlap and which might apply to children only.
Kids Privacy Assured by PRIVO: COPPA Safe Harbor Certification

Toca Boca, Inc is a member of the PRIVO Kids Privacy Assured COPPA Safe Harbor Certification Program (“the Program”). The Program certification applies to the digital properties listed on the validation page that is viewable by clicking on the PRIVO Seal. PRIVO is an independent, third-party organization committed to safeguarding children’s personal information collected online. The PRIVO COPPA certification Seal posted on this page indicates Toca Boca, Inc has established COPPA compliant privacy practices and has agreed to submit to PRIVO’s oversight and consumer dispute resolution process. If you have questions or concerns about our privacy practices, please contact us at dpo@spinmaster.com or 415-352-9028. If you have further concerns after you have contacted us, you can contact PRIVO directly at privacy@privo.com.

![COPPA Safe Harbor Certification](image)

General Privacy

What Kind of Information is Collected?

There are two types of data that may be collected. The first

*Our Privacy Policy, TocaBoca, [https://tocaboca.com/privacy/](https://tocaboca.com/privacy/) (last visited March 11, 2024) (accessed via the Mac App Store on a laptop).*


5. Outfit7

- Outfit7 develops the Talking Tom & Friends line of mobile device games for children. According to its website, Talking Tom & Friends has over 19 billion global game downloads, 85 billion video views, and over 3,000 products.

- Outfit7 makes it very difficult to find the privacy policy that applies to children in the United States. From the Outfit7 website, a user cannot find the policy that applies to applications specifically, only websites.


- From talkingtomandfriends.com, a user can navigate to The Family Guide, scroll down, and find that Outfit7 is certified by PRIVO. This seal is clickable. Privo’s website will direct a user to Outfit7’s website-focused privacy policy.
Data collection in our games

We follow the data minimization standard, which means that our games only collect and use data that is strictly necessary to perform our services.

You can read more about what data is collected, how it is used, and your rights regarding your data in our Privacy Policy.

- Just below PRIVO’s COPPA seal, a box labeled “Data collection in our games” directs users to a privacy policy that applies only to European users. This makes it impossible to know, from this page, whether Outfit7 adheres to data minimization in the United States as well as the EU. European Privacy Policy for Apps, Talkingtomandfriends.com, https://talkingtomandfriends.com/eea/en (last visited Mar. 11, 2024) (accessed via web browser on laptop).

- To find the privacy policy specific to United States-based children, we had to navigate to the Talking Tom page in the Apple App Store, where a link to the policy was provided at the bottom of the listing.

- This perpetual link tree is unacceptable. Parents have limited time. Those seeking to read and understand Outfit7’s privacy policy will be encouraged to give up and decline to monitor the application’s data practices.
